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PREFACE
In the fourteen years -which preceded. World War I, an
army was reborn in Great Britain*

For the first time in

recent British history an army was organized for war, a
concept -which is basic not only In Britain today but in every
major military po-wer in the world*
The movement for military reforms began slowly*
Britain's bumbling, muddling victory in the South African War
illuminated the armyfs problems*
probed the army*s ills*

Committees and commissions

Two Secretaries of State valiantly

attempted to institute reforms*

However, by 1906 the British

Army was, with minor exceptions, unchanged from the days of
Cardwell*

The years 1906

terized by dynamic changes.
stituted;

to 1909* however, were charac
The army was virtually recon

it was organized for war*

An Expeditionary Force

was created; a General Staff was established;

and from the

Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers a Territorial Force was
fashioned*
These were the accomplishments of Viscount Richard
Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War from 1905 to 1912*
He was the "architect11 of the British Army which acquitted
•

♦

itself with honor in World War I*
still evident today*

ii

The Haldane spirit is

ill
As a professional officer with a deep interest in
military history, I was naturally drawn to this milestone
in the history of one of the oldest and proudest armies in
the world.*

I intend to examine the influences and conditions

which in the years 1900 to 1906 brought the pot of army reform
to the boiling point and then portray the major reforms
instituted by R*B* Haldane which contributed to a rebirth of
the British Army*
It is difficult to thank all the people who have aided
me in this effort;

The Field-Marshals and Generals who gave

of their valuable time to answer my letters, particularly
Brigadier, Sir John 1C* Dunlop, a retired Territorial Officer
and a renowned Military author who not only patiently answered
my questions from his vast authoritative knowledge in this
area, but also furnished me with rare sources from his own
library;

Miss Ella Jane Dougherty of the Omaha University

Library whose patience and aid in locating research materials
is also worthy of mention.

I would also like to thank the

Department of History, Western Reserve University, for granting
me permission to use and quote from a doctoral dissertation
on this subject*

My wife, Angela, a dutiful Air Force wife,

deserves my thanks*

Finally, I owe a special debt to the

graduate faculty of the History Department of the University
of Omaha, particularly Dr* A* Stanley Trickett without whose
inspiration and guidance this thesis would have remained
merely an idea*
September 1 966

Harry H* Bendorf
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CHAPTER I
PRELUDE TO REFORM
In the history of the British Army reforms usually
follow war or catastrophe.
the Crimean War,

As the Cardwell reforms followed

so the Boer War sparked a reform of the

whole British defense structure.

The period 1900-1905 was

marked by several attempts at reform.

The ills of the patient,

the army, had been exposed by the Boer War and the government
of the day, like a doctor, probed for the proper diagnosis
through the employment of committees and commissions.

The

Secretaries of State for War attempted first one remedy and
then another; however, few reforms were translated from
theories into actions.
cance.

This period, was not without signifi

Faltering steps along the road to reform were taken

and the government became acutely aware that a thorough reor
ganization of the army was necessary.

This was the prelude,

the forerunner to a series of reforms which reshaped and
revitalized the entire British Army.
The Boer War and its Legacy
The Boer War, in the closing years of Victoria1s
reign, was a major stimulus for army reform.

When the con

flict broke out in 18 99 , the entire British force in South
Africa numbered only 22,000 men.

Reinforcements were

^■John Fortescue, The Empire and, the Army (Londoni
and. Company, Ltd., 1928), p. 305*

1

Cassell

2
desperately needed and all available regulars and reservists
■were organized into a field, force and. embarked, for South
O
Africa in the winter of 1899*
The needs of war served, to
illustrate an obvious weakness;

the army was undermanned.*

Most regular battalions were far below war strength, at that
time approximately 1,100 men, and had to be augmented by
considerable numbers of reservists*

The 2nd Devonshire

Battalion could muster only 461 regulars; more than 600
reservists were needed to augment the 2nd Battalion of South
Wales Borderers*

The 2nd Hampshires embarked for the war zone

250 men short, even after being complemented with all available
reservists*

This total force,

the 7th Infantry Division, was

composed, of 4,250 reservists and. 7,920 regulars when finally
dispatched, to South

Africa.

^

Such a state of affairs was

viewed, with justifiable alarm by British military leaders and.
thinking students of the British military system remembered
the problem after the conclusion of the War*
Not only were B r i tain1s regular battalions short of
men, but they had. to be reclothed*

A large number of British

units were still dressed, in the outmoded,

even if colorful,

regimentals which were unsuited, for modern combat service*

^John K* Dunlop, The Development of the British Army,
1899-1914 (Londons
Methuen, 193«)t p. 73.
3h *0. Arnold-Forster, The War Office, The Army and
The Empire
(London:
Cassell and Company, L t d . , 1900),
PP. 57-5^.

3
General Sir H. Brackenbury, Director-General of Ordnance, was
faced with the problem of equipping an entire army with suits
of khaki drill.**
Disaster befell the British Army in December, 1899»
Within one week*s time British forces were defeated at Stormberg,
Magersfontein and, Colenso.

MBlack Week, 11 as the period was

known, aroused, the nation, and the humiliating sting of the
defeat of British soldiers by untrained farmers was felt
throughout the length and breadth of the British Empire.-^
had at least one good effect;

Xt

it served as the trumpet call

to action on the stage of reform.

The Prime Minister,

in the House of Lords on January 30, 1900,

stated.,

speaking

MIt is

evident that there is something in your machinery that is
wrong.

...

X do not think that the British Constitution as

at present worked is a good fighting machine.

• ♦ •

^Dunlop, pp. 86- 8 7 . General Brackenbury was DirectorGeneral of Ordnance and it was his responsibility to provide
the troops with uniforms.
Forty thousand suits of khaki were
ordered in April, l899> but proved insufficient.
Boots and
helmets created additional supply problems.
•^William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 191^-1918
(2 vols.; Londonj
Cassell and Company, L t d ., 1926), Vol. I,
p. 1^.
Field-Marshal Robertson, a junior staff officer at
this time, served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff
during most of World War I.
Also see John Terraine, Douglas
Haig, The Educated Soldier (London: Hutchinson and. Co., Ltd.,
1963), p. 2b.
^Robertson, Vol. I, p. lb, citing "Hansard," January
30, 1900.
The Prime Minister further indicated in his speech
that other large nations might threaten Britain and that
changes were needed to meet this possibility.

k
It is to the credit of the officers and men of the
British Army that they managed to “muddle through1' to victory.
The British fighting man conducted himself with conspicuous
gallantry and adapted readily to a new method of warfare.
The Aldershot drill book was soon thrown away.

Buttons and

brass insignia were either dyed khaki or removed.

Officers

discarded swords, revolvers and "Sara Brownes," and adopted
the carbine and the Boer-type slouch hat.?

Lord Methuen,

while on campaign in South Africa, described himself thusly,
"l look like a second-class conductor in a khaki coat with
no mark of rank on it and a Boer hat and in Norwegian
g
slippers."
The army learned to "travel light" as supply
lines were extended.

Field.-Mar shal Lord Allenby,

then a

Squadron Commander of Cavalry, wrote home:
My property now consists of the dirty clothes I live
and sleep in day and night, a cloak, a saddle blanket,
a tooth brush, a box of cigarettes and, a tube of lanoline.
On the march I lived chiefly on biscuit and
beef tongues.
The horses are half starved.9
The war was won but at tremendous cost.

In thirty-one

months, 22,000 British lives were lost and the national debt
rose L222 million.1^

The cost in men and money exceeded

?W. Baring Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War (London:
B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 196*0, p. *f-0. "Sam Browne" refers to an
officer's leather sword belt.
8Ibxd.
9Bri an Gardner, Allenby (London:
Cassell, 196.5),
pp. 31-32.
Also see Archibald Wavell, Allenby:
A Study in
Greatness (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^1)* P* 85*

■^Pemberton, p. 206

5
Britain*s expenditure to defeat Napoleon.

11

The returning

army was not a resplendent force laden with trophies of war;
the scars of combat were much in evidence.

Winston Churchill,

then a young officer and correspondent, described the troops
as he watched them embark for England:
First the two cavalry brigades marched past and they
x*ere brigades no longer; the Household Cavalry Regiment
was scarcely fifty strong;
in all there were not 1,000
sabres.
Then Ridley*s l,if00 mounted infantry, the
remnants of what on paper was a brigade of nearly 5 #000;
thirty guns dragged by skinny horses. •
Xn the years to
Boer War.

follow there were many lessons learned from

On 13 December 1899* Lord Esher prophesied,

the

MThis

war will do two things - change our whole military system in
England and alter military tactics throughout the world.
His prophecies were fulfilled.
became apparento

Some of the defects immediately

A strike force was sorely needed as demon

strated by the haphazard, augmentation of the force initially
ill
dispatched to South Africa.
There was virtually no army
left in England;

the entire regular force had been sent to

South Africa, and no organized military reserve remained in
1:LEric W. Sheppard,, A Short History of the British
Army (ifth ed., London:
Constable and. Co., L t d . , 1950), p. 290.
■^Winston S. Churchill, Frontiers and Wars (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and. World, Inc., 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 567*
■^Maurice V* Brett (ed.), Journals and Letters of
Reginald. Viscount Esher (if vols.; London: Ivor Nicholson and.
Watson, Ltd.., 1934), Vol. I, p. 2if9* Lord Esher was close
to the court.
He was interested in army matters and was
extremely influential in army reform.

l^portescue, p. 308

6
Britain in the event of another conflict.

This realization

shocked many British l e a d e r s . ^
Staffs were untrained and poorly utilized at every
level of command.

In 1899 there was no General Staff at the

War Office1^ and Field Commanders complained bitterly about the
lack of intelligence information.

This is not surprising since

only nineteen officers staffed the entire Intelligence Depart
ment at the War Office.

Accurate terrain maps were hard to

cotae b y , an understandable complaint since there were only
twenty-eight personnel serving in the War Office Cartographic
Section..^7

Staff officers in the field were, in many cases,

officers who had no prior training in their duties,

18

and orders

were frequently dispatched through the use of aides instead of
normal command channels,
Lord Roberts,

thereby circumventing the field s t a f f s . ^

testifying later before the Royal Commission,

indicated that the staff officers of the army in South Africa
h a d not been satisfactory.

He blamed this on a lack of training

and the fact that there were no definite duties established for
^ A r n o l d - F o r s t e r , p. 46.

Also see Dunlop, p. 124.

l6Ibid., p. 7 1 .
^*7pavid James, Lord Roberts (London:
1954), p. 275.
18

Arnold,

Hollis and Carter,

L.S. Araery, The Problem of the Army (London:
1903), p. 272.

-^Robertson, Vol. I, p. 1?.

Edward

7
the various staff functions.

He pointed out that r‘. • • staff

officers cannot be improvised, nor can they learn their duties,
like the rank and, file, in a few weeks or months.

. • •

The fallacy of creating field, forces and staffs at the time
of mobilization had, certainly been recognized.2 -^
The government was becoming aware of the army’s
problems.

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,

of State for War,

a previous Secretary

charged that ,f. . • the government knew the

extent of the Boer armaments,

etc., they are culpable for not

having either checked them or strengthened the colonies
against them.

• • •

.,22

Not only government and military

leaders analyzed army weaknesses, but some of the more per
ceptive junior officers also recognized the failings and pro
posed solutions.

In 1900, Major Allenby noted H. • • the whole
23
organization of the array was utterly out of date. • • •"
He

recommended a uniformly organized, army based, on wartime structure and training for staff officers.

24

James, p. 352.
21pred,erick Maurice, Haldane, 1856-1915. Vol. I:
The
Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan (2 vols.; London:
Faber and
Faber, Ltd., 1937),
22

J.A. Spender, The Life of the Right Honorable Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London: Hodder and Stoughton, L t d •,
n . d . ), Vol. I, p* 2j?6•
2^Gardner, p. 33*
24

1900.

Allenby x*as a staff college graduate, a rarity in
This may account for his forward-looking views.

8
The need for a striking force and organization of an
array for "war was paramount.

The lack of a General Staff or

staffs at the lower level had. also become a matter for c o n c e r n , ^
These were some of the problems which faced

the Secretary of

State for War, St. John Brodrick.
The Brodrick Scheme
St. John Brodrick, who entered the cabinet in October
of 1900,^^ was no stranger to the War Office.

He had served

as Financial Secretary to the War Office and. several years as
Under-Secretary for War.

27
'

To become Secretary

War had been Brodrick s lifelong ambition

of State for

and. he wasted

little time in proposing his preconceived plan for reform.

In

his speech on Army Estimates 28 February 1901, Mr. Brodrick
proposed, an organization of Six Army Corps, made up of Regulars,
Militia,

and Volunteers.

Three of these Army Corps were to

serve as an Expeditionary Force ready for immediate deployment
and three of them were to be used for home defense.

These Six

Army Corps were to be geographically distributed throughout
Great Britain.

The First Army Corps at Aldershot, .the Second

^■^Aroery, p. 11.
26R.C.K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of The
Oxford History of England, ed.o G.Ku diark
vols.; Oxfords
Clairendon P r e s s , 1936), p® 612.
Brodrick later became Viscount
Midieton.
^Dunlop,
2?Brett

p. 128.

(ed.), Vol. I, p. 2 6 9 .

9
Corps at Salisbury Plain, the Third, in Ireland,
Army Corps at Colchester,

the Fourth

and the Fifth and Sixth Army

Corps at York and Edinburgh,

respectively•

The initial

proposal provided, for seventy-nine Infantry Battalions of the
Line at home and seventy-seven abroad*
composition of the

By 1903> a detailed

six Army Corps organization was p u b l i s h e d . ^

The Six Army Corps organization, a conglomerate of
regular and auxiliary forces, was not very practical.

It must

be remembered that during the first part of Mr. B rodrick1s term
at the War Office the British Army was still engaged in the
Boer War;

the scheme, therefore,

depended on troops still

serving in South A frica0
The Brodrick plan invited, immediate criticism.
Esher,

Lord

constantly vigilant of army activities, wrote King

Edward. VII that,

considering present conditions at the War

Office with military officials each going their own way, the
War M inister1s task had an air of h o p e l e s s n e s s . ^

Brodrick had.

few supporters; Sir Henry Campbell—Bannerman wrote to a close
friend,

“You ask about Brodrick*s Army scheme.

it freely.
Civilian.

”31

Certainly attack

It has no friends that I know of - Military or
King Edward VII must also be numbered among Mr.

Brodrick* s critics.

He believed that the War Minister did not

29Bunlop, pp. 131-137.
^ B r e t t (ed.), Vol. I, p. 401.
Lord Esher maintained
an active correspondence with the King and other members of
the court.
Esher served as King Edward* s “eyes and e ars’1 on
army matters.
^ S p e n d e r , Vol. II, p. 88.
Campbell-Bannerman, an
ex-Secretary of State for War, believed that the old army
should be left alone and. not meddled with.

10
TABLE 1
THE COMPOSITION OF THE SIX AKMY CORPS*
. First Army Corps (Aldershot) and First Cavalry Brigade,
Headquarters, Aldershot
Cavalry
Artillery
Infantry

5 Regiments
27 Batteries
25 Battalions

Regular
Regular
Regular

Second Army Corps (Southern) and Second Cavalry Brigade,
Headquarters, Tidv?orth
Cavalry
Artillery
Infantry

5 Regiments
27 Batteries
25 Battalions

Regular
Regular
Regular

Third. Army Corps (Irish) and Third Cavalry Brigade
Cavalry
Artillery
Infantry

5 Regiments
27 Batteries
25 Battalions

Regular
24 Regular
22 Regular

3 Militia
3 Militia

Fourth Army Corps (Eastern) and Household Cavalry Brigade,
Headquarters, London
Cavalry
Artillery
Infantry

5 Regiments
27 Batteries
25 Battalions

4 Regular
18 Regular
8 Regular

1 Imperial
6 Militia
8 Militia

Yeomanry
3 Volunteer
9 Volunteer

Fifth Army Corps (Northern) and Fourth Cavalry Brigade,
Headquarters, York
Cavalry
Artillery
Infantry

5 Regiments
27 Batteries
25 Battalions

1 Regular
18 Regular
4 Regular

4 Imperial
6 Militia
13 Militia

Yeomanry
3 Volunteer
8 Volunteer

Sixth Army Corps (Scottish), Headquarters, Edinburgh
Calvalry
Artillery
Infantry

5 Regiments
26 Batteries
25 Battalions

Imperial Yeomanry
17 Regular
6 Militia
2 Regular
13 Militia

3 Volunteer
10 Volunteer

*John K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army,
1894-1914 (London;
M e thuen, 19 3 & ) , pp. 137-138, citing
Command Paper l4l3» 1903*

11
give proper credence to the views of his military advisors.
The King wrote Brodrick indicating his support in matters of
reform but also alluded to criticism which he had to make of
the Brodrick scheme.

The Sovereign, interested in the most

minute details affecting his army, even criticized Brodrick*s
choice of khaki uniforms for the

Yeomanry.

3^

Press reaction to the Six Army Corps scheme also was
deprecatory•

Blackwood*s Edinburgh Magazine attacked Mr.

Brodrick for his lack of action and for the fact that the Six
Army Corps scheme was nothing but a paper organization.3^
One of the most active oponents of the Brodrick plan
was a young member of Parliament, Winston Churchill.

The fact

that Brodrick was married to the daughter of one of Churchill*s
best friends did not deter the member from O l d h a m . ^

Mr.

Churchill*s criticisms of the Brodrick scheme verbalized the
3^3idney Lee, The R e i g n , Vol. XI: King Edward VXI,
A Biography (2 vols.j London:
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1927)>
Vol. II., pp. 200-208.
The King argued that the Yeomanry
would, only see limited service abroad, therefore, khaki was
unnecessary.
He settled, for colorful facings, however, when
he found that Lord Roberts supported, khaki uniforms.
*^A perusal of The Times (London) in the years 1901
and 1902 indicates overwhelming dissatisfaction with Mr.
Brodrick*s proposals.
This can be partially attributed to
L.S. Amery, Military Correspondent, who opposed the scheme.
3^*»Mr. Brodrick and Army Re fo r m , u Blackwood *s
Edinburgh Mag az in e, January - June, 1902, ppI 5^3-537*
33p@ter de Mendelssohn, The Age of Churchill
(London; Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. l8 9.

12
feelings of many groups and elements in the government,
Churchill wielded the verbal cudgel with eloquence aid effect.
He was certainly instrumental in sounding the death knell for
Brodrick*s proposals.

He first attacked the plan on the basis

of its expense; in the House of Commons on May 12, 1901,
Churchill stated,

MX regard, it as a grave mistake in Imperial

policy to spend thirty millions a year on the Army.11*^
Churchill accurately sensed that the public had quickly forgotten
the defeats of the Boer War and was interested in tightening
the purse strings .^7

Further, he questioned the need for an

array of such extraordinary size and quoted the inane question
of one member of Parliament who asked:
What are we to do with our generals? When they come
home from South Africa with no more worlds to conquer
they must keep their hands in, and they must be
p r o v i d e d w i t h an army, even if it does cost thirty mil
lions a year to save them from getting out of practice.
Churchill derisively replied,

nI had always been led to believe

that generals existed, for the Army and not the Army for the
generals,"^

The scheme was denounced in the press, in the

House of Commons and by the military.

Churchill further con

tended that the three Army Corps Expeditionary Force should, be
reduced to one Army Corps.
enough to fight savages,

He reasoned 11. • . one is quite

and three are not enough even to

^ W i n s t o n g e Churchill, Mr, Brodrick*s Army (London?
Arthur L. Humphreys, 1 9 0 3 ) 9 P»
-^Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present (London:
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 191 ^ ) 9 p. 2&1.
^ C h u r c h i l l , Mr. Brodrick* s A rm y, p. 18.

13
begin to fight Europeans.11^
There is no doubt that young Churchill* s views were
somewhat parochial and that he was a firm believer in the
‘‘Blue Water Doctrine.tf

He declaimed,

“The honour and secur

ity of the British Empire do not depend, and can never depend,
on the British Army.

The Admiralty is the only Office strong

enough to insure the British Empire.

• • •

Churchill also charged that Britain was not getting
her money*s worth.

France was paying twenty-eight millions

for twenty Array Corps;

Germany could buy twenty-two Army Corps
♦

at a price tag of twenty-six millions;

and Russia could fund
kl
twenty-three Army Corps with thirty-two millions.
By January of 1903* Brodrick*s plan was clearly marked

a failure, yet Churchill was not content.

He continued to

condemn Brodrick and the scheme in his speeches.

He objected

that the plan did not properly provide for the defense of
England.

It was too costly.

He branded the scheme an

11• • • ill considered conglomeration of absurdities.

]|O
• • •11

Brodrick*s proposals for enlistments also came under
Churchill*s guns, and the young member of Parliament continued

^9Ibid., p. 22.
^ I b i d ., p.

2

h.

^ Ibid o > p. 3 0 .
^ I b i d ., pp. 60-61.

14
his attack on the unfortunate War Ministers
Two years ago he /Brodriclk/ told us that he adhered
to a system of enlistment whereby men serve seven years
in the Army and five with the Reserve, and last year
he came down to the House of Commons with a new plan
of their serving three years with the colours and nine
with the Reserve. • • *43
Brodrick had only realized a fraction of his plan.

Churchill

did not fail to grasp this fact and criticized:
The first Army Corps is not yet half formed; the
Second Army Corps is a mere skeleton; the Third. Army
Corps is incomplete.
The Fourth Army Corps consists
of Lord Grenfell, who is and needs to be a host in
himself.
And as for the Fifth and Sixth Army Corps,
where are they7 I am told, that one of them is
lying in a pigeon-hole at the War Office, and. that
Mr. Brodrick has taken the other with him in a red
.^
dispatch-box on his cruise in the Mediterranean. . . .
Churchill was one of many, but the most articulate of the critics.
The influential JL.S. Amery compared the Brodrick Army Corps to
one of Hans Christian Andersen*s fairy t a l e s . ^
Brodrick*s scheme was a monumental failure; however, he
must be credited with some excellent improvements in the British
Army.

Under his administration an improved rifle was adopted;

heavy artillery xvas introduced,;

ambulances were improved;

the

expense of uniforms was reduced and. their serviceability was
increased.

An experimental barrack was built which allowed.

soldiers to have a small cubicle to themselves instead of
living in a large open bay.

The War Office also received some

^ I bi d. , p. 62.
^ I b i d . , p. 64.
Considerable use of Churchill* s speeches
and quotations are made here because he was one of Brodrick* s
most consistent and articulate critics.
^ A m e r y , p. 2 7 *

1:5
much-needed, attention.

Mobilization and. Intelligence were

placed under a single head and a department of Education and
Training was also c r e a t e d . ^

The War Office career of Brodrick

ended in the autumn of 1903* and he became Secretary for India.
Committees and Commissions
The story of army reform in those uncertain days would,
be incomplete without a description of the multitude of
committees and Royal Commissions which were constituted to
j
review and. investigate army problems.
Between the Crimean War
and the year 1904, there are records of 567 committees and
commissions dealing with the British Army.
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The first commission which came to grips with the
problems of the army in the final years of Victoria*s reign
was the famous Hartington Commission.

This commission was

appointed in 1888 to investigate the administration of the
army and navy and. their relationship with the treasury.

Lord

Randolph Churchill and Mr. Campbell-Bannerman were two
members of this body. 48
in two sections;

The reports of this commission were

one was rendered in I8 8 9 , the other in

1890.^9

^James,

p. 3^3

^ H a m p d e n Gordon, The War Office (London:
1935), p p . 48-49.
^¥heeler,
^Gordon,

p. 244.
p. 68.

Putnam,
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The Hartington Commission recommended that the post of
Commander-in Chief should be abolished and. be replaced by
a General Officer responsible to the Secretary of State for
War and that a General Staff be created.*-*0
mendations been implemented immediately,

Had these recom

the work of future

commissions might have been eased considerably.

However, the

report was weakened by Campbell-Bannerman who submitted, a
dissenting minority opinion.
of a Chief of Staff.

He took issue with the creation

He considered the post unnecessary as it

would too closely pattern the British Army after the Prussian
staff.^1
The reactions of the Command,©r-in Chief, the Duke of
Cambridge, and Queen Victoria were predictable;

the Queen

termed the report abominable and. the Duke warned of catas
trophic implications.*^

The considerations were political;

the Queen had. utilized a royal Commander-in Chief as her
liaison with the army for forty years and at this time she
was considering the Duke of Connaught as the logical successor
*5°Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XXX
(Reports of Commissioners), Cmd. 5979* 1890, “Preliminary
Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to enquire into
the Civil and Professional Administration of the Naval and
Military Departments,11 pp. 1-17* cf.
Amery, pp. 291-292,
citing The H a r t i n g t o n >Commission Report.
■^Spender, Vol. I, pp. 117-119*
^ G o r d o n , p. 6 9 *

17
t
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to his cousin s post*

The recommendations-of the Hartington Commission did.
not come to pass until later years.

In his memoirs, Field

Marshal Sir William Robertson wrote,

MSo long as these views

prevailed, ^Th.e Queen*s and Campbell-Bannerman xsJ it was not
possible for the Empire to be provided with the requisite
measure of military security,

and nothing of much value was

in fact done until some fourteen years later.*1^
The next commission of importance was the Elgin
Commission.

The bitter experience of the South African War

fresh up>on his mind,

King Edward, VII pressed for an investi

gation in August of 1901.

However, when the cabinet recom

mended. a Royal Commission of Investigation in 1902, the King
objected to % ’ashing one*s dirty linen in p u b l i c . T h e
cabinet, however, persevered and. the King relented.

It was

56
he who suggested, Lord Esher serve on the commission-' which

was officially constituted in 1902 as the Royal Commission
on the War in South Africa.

The chairman of the commission

5 3 j a m e S 9 p p # 222-223*
This attitude was clearly re
flected. in a letter to the King from Lord Esher who wrote,
nTbe recommendation of the Commission was not carried out,
because the Queen, very naturally, at the end of her Majesty*s
long life and reign was unwilling to face the consideration
of so great a change. 11 See Brett (ed. ), Vol. I, p. 409*

^Robertson,

Vol. I, p. 9*

•^Lee, Vol. II, p. 91.

•5^Ibid. , p. 92.

■was the Earl of Elgin;

Viscount Esher and Sir George

Taubman-Goldie -were among its most prominent members.
The purpose of this group was to investigate the preparations
which had been made for war in South Africa, particularly in
the area of equipment and, p e r s o n n e l . ^

The investigation of

the commission was thorough and complete; more than 22,000
questions were asked and 114 witnesses e x a m i n e d . ^
Throughout the proceedings, Lord Esher faithfully
kept the King informed.

On October 14, 1902, he directed the

Sovereign*s attention to Kitchener*s recommendations for more
/Ta

training for both officers and men. u

As witnesses were

called and examined, Esher continued his voluminous corres
pondence to King Edward VII.

Lord Esher was particularly

impressed by the detailed testimony of Lord Roberts who displayed an excellent grasp of the entire military situation.
As the commission began to consider its report,
evident that all members were not in agreement.
wrote on 30 April 1903*
with the Commission.

it became
Lord Esher

"We had a long and difficult day

It was a prolonged wrangle over the

•^Dunlop, pp. 148-149*
The Royal Commission on the
War in South Africa was also known as the “Elgin Commission.
It was also incorrectly referred to as the “Esher Commission.11
■^Dunlop, p» l66o
^Jaraes, p. 387<>
6°Brett

(ed.), Vol. I, pp. 333-336.

^-*-X b i d ., pp. 368 - 369 .
Commander-in Chief.

Lord. Roberts was at this time
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Report,

and there is no chance of an agreement upon the
/To

points -which I care most about.*
The Elgin Commission published, its findings in August
of 1903*

The deficiencies revealed can be best summed, up in

the words of the reports
Only an extraordinary combination of fortunate circum
stances, external and internal, saved the Empire during
the early months of 1900 and there is no reason to
expect a repetition of such fortune, if, as appears
probable, the next national emergency still finds us
discussing our preparation.^3
The report offered no particular recommendations but summar
ized. the state of unpreparedness for war which existed in
the Br i t i sh A r m y •
Lord Esher, however,

submitted an important minority

report concerning War Office organization.

He recommended

that the War Office Council be reorganized, and. their functions
be defined.; that the War Department must be decentralized
internally

and, most important,

that the post of Commander-in

Chief be abolished and a General Officer who was responsible
to the Secretary of State for War be appointed,.

Sir George

Taubman-Goldie added, his concurrence to the views of Viscount
Esh er .^

62I b i d o , p. iK>0.
^ J a m e s , p. 392, quoting Report of the Royal Commission
on the South. African War, 1903»
filx

Amery, pp. 295-301, citing Lord Esher-1s Memorandum
on War Office Organization.
This memorandum, as well as
S i r T a u bm an -G o ld ie *s views are reproduced in Amery*s book.
Also see Dunlop, pp. 203-20L.
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In April, 1903» another commission, the Norfolk
Commission, was formed.

This body concerned itself, with the

Auxiliary Forces and an exploration into the possibility of
compulsory service. 63
^

The commission,

chaired by the Duke

of Norfolk, numbered among its members the Earl of Derby,
Baron Grenfell and many distinguished, militia and volunteer
officers.

One of these was K. Spenser Wilkinson,0

author

of The Brain of an A r my , a book which wielded tremendous
influence on the later establishment of a General Staff.

This

commission was charged to determine whether the organization
of the Auxiliary Forces tvas adequate and to recommend changes
to insure their efficiency and strength.

'

The commission made many valuable recommendations,
particularly those pertaining to the Volunteers.

It proposed

a system for training volunteer officers and giving them
monetary grants to attend schools to improve their efficiency.
Recommendations to improve training in musketry and gunnery
also were proposed. u
Even though not explicit,

the Norfolk Commission

recommended some measure of conscription to augment Militia
ZfQ

and. Volunteer forces.

H.O. Arnold-Forster, Secretary of

^ I b i d . , p. 151*
The Norfolk Commission was also
referred to as the MAuxiliary Forces Commission."
66Ibid., p. 173^ ^Ibid

.

^ I b i d . , pp. 315-319s> citing Report of the Norfolk
Commission.
The extract from this report is contained, in
Appendix H of Dunlop.
^ x b i d ., p. 17&.
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State for War at that time, indicated his irritation with the
report of this commission when he wrote to his sister, 11At
the, last moment there comes on the top of me the report of
the Auxiliary Forces Commission; and every recommendation in
it means money.11?'0

On the other hand, Lord Roberts, Comman-

der-in Chief and a staunch supporter of compulsory service,
firmly supported the findings of this commission,^
In 1903? the King placed considerable pressure on
Lord Ssher to become Secretary of State for War.

Esher,

however, did, not want the post and considered himself more
valuable in his present capacity.

He preferred the guise

of subtle influence to the mantle of public office.

Esher,

however, did consent to act as Chairman of a committee to
72
reorganize the War Office,
On September 27, 1903* he wrote
Lord Knollys, the iingfs Secretary, nIf this plan is adopted
and I am chairman of such a body, I shall propose to take the
War Office Administration right through, from top to bottom
and endeavor to make it a first class business machine. • • •
It was at King Edward’s urging that the committee of three was
^Mrs. H.O. Arnold.-For ster, The Right Honourable Hugh
Oakeley Arnold-Forster, A Memoir (London; Edward Arnold, 1910),
p. 255> hereafter cited as Memoir.
^James, pp. Ll3-^1^.
?^Brett
public office.
ship for War as
as Secretary to

(ed.). Vol. II, pp. lL-1 8 . Lord Esher shunned
He had previously refused, the Under-Secretary
well as other important offices. He did serve
H.M. Office of Works from 1895-1902.

^ I b i d . , p. 2 3 .
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appointed to consider the complete reorganization of the War
Office

In November 1903*

the membership -was constituted.

It consisted of Viscount Esher as Chairman, Admiral Sir John
Fisher,

and Sir George Sydenham Clarke.

G„F. Ellison was appointed Secretary,

Lieutenant-Colonel
a post which was to

have a profound influence on his career.
The committee worked x^ith speed and dispatch and the
first of the committee*s recommendations were submitted on
30 December 1903®

The group recommended that the Office of

the Secretary of State for War should be placed on an equiva
lent plane with the First Lord, of the Admiralty;

the adminis

tration of the War Office should be vested in an Army Council,
headed, by the Secretary of State, and composed of four
military members and, two members of Parliament.

The committee

further proposed, the abolition of the post of Commander-in
Chief;

that a General Staff be established;

and, that an

Inspector General be appointed to insure efficient and stan
dard training for the army.

The committee also proposed a

revision of financial c o n t r o l . ^

These recommendations were

well received and the King wanted to decorate the committee
in recognition of their services.
Prime Minister,

However, Mr. Balfour,

the

did not concur since Fishex* was elevated to

First Sea Lord and the post of the Secretary of the Imperial
7\ e e } Vol. II, p. 19L.
^Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, p. 30*

7^lbid., pp.

79-80*

Also see Gordon, p. 78.

Also see Lee, Vol. II, pp. 196-197*
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Defense Committee had gone to Clarke*^

He considered these

rewards sufficient*
Government reaction was almost immediate.
Council was appointed on February 8, 190^*^®
was also favorable*

The Army

Press reaction

The Times heralded the committee report

as 11. • • One of the most important state documents issued
in this generation.

Lord Esher was naturally pleased with

the reception of the report.

He noted, {,The thing which

gratifies me i s the enthusiasm of the young officers of the
Army.

They are more than friendly.

Lord Roberts alone, among

the older men, is full of congratulation.**?0

The office of

the Commander-in Chief was finally abolished.*

There was little

consideration for the feelings of Lord Roberts, incumbent of
that office, or for some of his fellow officers*

In order to

vacate the post and to mollify Lord Roberts, he was offered
the Inspector Generalship which, after serving as Commanderin Chief, he was bound to refuse.

Arthur Balfour wrote to

Roberts, ’’it is, of course, impossible for me to suggest that
on the abolition of the post of Commander-in Chief you would
accept this new and. as now designed, distinctly inferior
position. • • .,t8^
^ Ibid. The King deferred to Mr. Balfour*s desires*
He made sure, however, that the government knew of his high
regard for these three individuals.
^Dunlop, p* 2 0 8 .
79The Ti mes (London), February 1, 190^*
80Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 4l-J*2.
81

James, p. *K)2.

180081
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The lack of respect and the abruptness of manner with
which high ranking officers were being dismissed at the War
Office left much to be desired.

General Henry Wilson,

referring to the committee of three, commented, nThe trium
virate are carrying on like madmen. . •

He also noted, the

rapidity with which the changeover of the War Office took
place.82
The Esher Committee recommendations were a positive
beginning.

Much was yet left to be donej however, the period

of attempts, experiments and unsuccessful schemes was not yet
past •
Mr. Arnold-Forster at the War Office
While the committees and commissions were grinding
out their findings and recommendations, another change had
taken place at the War Office.

Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster

had succeeded. St. John Brodrick to the War Office post.

The

Prime Minister invited Arnold-Forster to become a member of
83
the cabinet in October 1903*
and Arnold-Forster was
immediately faced with a personal decision.

He had just

recently suffered a slight heart attack while horseback
riding

8^

and was uncertain of his physical fitness for this

82C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson; His
Life and Diaries (2 vols.l New York: Ch ar1es Scribner‘s Sons,
*192TT> Vol“. II, p. 55* Also cited in James, p. 402.
8*^Arnold-Forster, Memoir, p. 22L.
^Xbid.,

p. 2 2 3 .
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strenuous undertaking.

However, the new War Minister had

definite ideas about array reorganization and believed that
he deserved his chance to carry them out.8-2 His was to be .
a short career laden with frustrations and opposition which
hounded, him at every turn.
he faced.

He clearly realized the obstacles

It was only days after he accepted the seals of

the War Office that he confided to his brother,
"Parliamentary time must be short - may even be very short the Party, on whose support I must rely, is torn by
conflicting views* « , •

O£

Arnold-Forster was not a newcomer to army problems
and, was eminently qualified to undertake the task he set out
to do.

His qualifications are well summed up in his own words*

• . • I have been a most careful student of all
questions connected with the services* Of the
actual experiences of war I do not pretend to have
any knowledge, but of soldiers I have seen some
thing, I have been at the manoeuvres of nearly
every army in Europe, and constantly at those of
our own troops* I have marched with the infantry
regiments and ridden with the artillery* I have
seen artillery firing and experiments in gunnery
of every kind*®?
The new Secretary of State for War had also written extensively about the army and army problems*

OO

Esher, whose hand

8-5Ibid., pp, 223-226.
86Ibid., p. 2 2 5 *
8?Arnold,-Forster, The War Office, The Army, and The
Empire, p. 5*
88

Arnold-Forster, Memoir, p. 371«

26
continued on the pulse of army affairs, warned Balfour
". • • Do not let Arnold-Forster be in a hurry.
created six beautiful Army Corps on p a p e r .

Brodrick

Let his younger

colleague beware."89
Arnold-Forster1s environment was not a pleasant one.
The army was bitter because it had been the. target of continued
organizational changes and its pride had. suffered as the result
of the post-Boer War investigations and inquiries.
For ster was also faced with the cry for economy.

ArnoldThe British

people were tiring of carrying the burden of the wartime army
budget.Time

for planning was short.

The new War Secretary

was immediately faced with several considerations.

The

three-year enlistment policy had. failed and the recommendations
of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa also were
still largely without action.

He immediately drafted a

memorandum which was circulated among the Army Council,
cabinet and the military leaders.

the

91-

Basically, Arnold-Forster1s recommendations were theses
The British Army should be made up of a Long Service Army and
an army for home service.

The Long Service Army would be

composed of regular battalions and would be eligible for
8^Brett

(ed.), Vol. IX, p. 31.

9°Arnold-Forster, M em o i r , pp. 232-233.
Ibid., pp. 236- 2 3 7 .
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service throughout the Empire.

The Home Army would be tasked

with the responsibility of reinforcing the Long Service Army
and expansion in the event of war.

The terms of enlistment for

the Home Army would be fifteen months with the colors and six
years in the reserve, whereas the Long Service soldier would
serve nine years on active duty and three in the reserve*
Arnold-Forster also proposed, the reduction of several bat
talions of regulars whereas a large portion of the Militia
would, make up the Home Service Army.
Militia would be disbanded.. 92

The remainder of the

Brodrick is Army Corps system

was effectively discontinued with the new scheme proposed by
Arnold-Forster.
High ranking militia officers who sat in the House
of Lords and, h a d vested interests in the Militia wasted no
time in making their influence felt.

93

Xn the spring of 190L,

Arnold-Forster began to sense the spirit of opposition that
was building against him.
want to do," he wrote,

-

people.

"Of course I know exactly what I

"but the trouble is to persuade other

119l^
The War Secretary also encountered considerable delay

95
in moving his memorandum through the cabinet and the C o u n c i l . ^
"Here am I," he wrote in June 190^,

"in a sea of troubles, not

92Ibid., pp. 239-2^ 1 .
93Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, p. 5 8 .

Arnold-Forster, M e mo ir , pp* 251-252.

^Dunlop, p. 178.
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all of ray own making.

My statement has been put off - to the

Greek Kalends, perhaps;

X know not.11^

Finally in July of 1904, the War Minister addressed
the House of Commons and presented his complete proposal for
the reorganization of the army and the War Office.
malized his scheme for the two armies.

He for

He asked, for a reduc

tion of Volunteers and Militia, however, he proposed to take
60,000 Volunteers into his Home Army.
tions,

With his recommenda

the old Cardwellian principle of linked, battalions was

abandoned•97
A part of the General Service Army was to be quartered
at Aldershot and serve as a striking force.

The Home Army

was to be composed of 107 Guard and. Line Battalions whereas
the General Service Army would be composed of 185 Guard and

Line Battalions.98
The opposition now began to form in strength.

The

press reaction was generally unfavorable; Lieutenant-Colonel
A.W.A.

Pollock,

the editor of United Services Magazine, con

demned Arnold-Forster1s scheme for not including a provision
for conscription.99

Lord C.F. Haliburton,

a previous

9^Arnold.-Forster, M e m o i r , p. 255*
97jbid., pp. 265-2 6 7 .

Also see Dunlop, pp. 180-181.

98 ibid.
99a.W.A. Pollock, “Army Reorganization,11 The Fort
nightly Revi ew , Vol. LXXVT (July to December, 190^),
pp. 1064-10 72.
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TABLE 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL SERVICE ARMY AND
THE HOME SERVICE ARMY AS PROPOSED B Y
H.O. ARNOLD-FORSTER*

Number of Battalions
Foot
Guards
10
Home
Total
Total
and
Total

• • • • • • •
for Home
• •
for Colonies
Egypt • • • •
for India
Total

* * * *

All
Ranks

Line
Battalions

--

26 General Service
71 Home Service

9,079
21,024
36,920

10

97

67,023

—
—

26 General Service
52 General Service

22,438
53,924

10

175

—

mm mm

143,385

♦John K* Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 18991914 (London*
Methuen, 1933), p* 181, citing Command Paper
1910, .August 1, 1904.

Under-Secretary for War published a pamphlet entitled Army
Organization, in which he summed up the scheme as
fl* • • illogical, incongruous and impracticable*1,100
The attacks began to tell on the unfortunate War Minister
and he related to his sister in August of 1904,

"Yes, I am a

Secretary of State, no doubt, but not destined, 1 fear, to be
a very fortunate o ne *11’1’01

He had little doubt that both the

military and the public stood solidly against him*
■^^Lord Haliburton, Army Organization (London*
Stanford, 1905)* P* 44*
^ ^ A r n o l d - F o r s t e r , Memoir, p. 273*

Edward
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When Parliament reconvened in 1905, the pressure
continued*

In February of that year he was taken to task by

the honorable member from Oldham, Winston Churchill, on the
policy of enlistments*

Churchill, who was concerned, with the

constant altering of the enlistment period., charged that in
a span of four years the enlistment period had undergone five
changes and that stability was needed.*102

In April, 1905,

Campbell-Bannerman rose in the House of Commons to belabor the
unfortunate War Minister,

charging that no progress was being

made in the area of army reform and that during the last four
years one scheme ha d followed another*10^

Campbell-Bannerman

believed there was a distinct lack of unity in the proposed
reforms and that Arnold-Forster was not getting to the root of
the matter*

This opinion was shared by many in the House of
104
Commons and the army.
Arnold-For ster was beset not only
by the opposition from the army and the government;
Brodrick and Lord. Lansdowne, his two predecessors,
against him.

St* John
also schemed

After all, he was condemning their administra

tions* 10 ^

102Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series,
CXLI (1905), P« 1193, hereafter cited, as "Pari. Debs.".
103ibid*, CXLV (1 9 0 5 ), P. 6 1 1 .
10^Spender, Vol* II, pp. 149-150.
10^Elie Hal6vy, The Rule of Democracy, 1905-1914,
Vol. Vis
A History of English People in the Nineteenth
Century, trans* E* I . W a t k i n s ("6 vol s.; New York*
Barnes and
Noble, Inc., 1 9 6 1), p* 171*
Their opposition was earlier
predicted by Lord. Esher*
See Brett (ed.«), Vol* II, p* 32*
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King Edward VII must also be counted among the
opposition*

He did not appreciate the highhanded methods of

Arnold-Forster who either did. not keep him fully informed of
proposed reforms or did not give the monarch adequate time to
106
study the proposals he presented to him*
After the l^fth
of July 190.5 speech,

the King let it be known "• * * that what

the Army, expecially the Officers throughout the Army, requires
at the present time, is a period free from disturbance and
constant change*
As the year 1905 came to an end, the Unionists were
swept from office,
crowed,

and with them Arnold-Forster•

Lord Esher

"The change of Government has produced one great good

at least*

It has rid us of Arnold-For ster •

The unfortunate War Minister cannot be held solely
accountable for his failures*

He was tactless and overbearing

with his generals, yet he was also dedicated,
difficult to sway*

sincere and

H*0* Arnold-Forster did not believe in

compromi se.
The demise of Arnold-Forster1s ill-fated, reforms must
also be attributed to other factorst

the failure to fill

enlistments for the outposts of the Empire;

the powerful and

influential militia officers who protected their vested
interests from their lofty seats in the House of Lords;
lo6Lee, Vol. XI, pp. 196-208, passim.
107I b i d . , p. 205.
lo8Brett (ed.), Vol. XX, p. 132.

and

’
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'

the opposition in the House of Commons, particularly from those
who wished to economize on the army in order to benefit the
navy. 109
*
The Lack of Professionalism in the Army
To place this era of attempted reforms into its proper
perspective, it is necessary to consider one more important
factor - the army and its lack of professionalism.
The army which fought in the Boer War was basically
without change from the days of Cardwell.
Duke of Wellington h a d complained that,

Years earlier the

“Nobody in the British

Army ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be
a guide for his conduct, or in any other manner than as an
1 -| A

amusing novel.*!

This distinct lack of professionalism was

still prevalent among Queen V i c t o r i a 1s officers.
calling was once referred to as,
ment of a gentleman. “H I

The military

f*A phase in the sporting equip

It was certainly so considered by many

of the army officers of that day.

One historian described the

British Army as "An army of ordinary men officered by gentle
men."^'**^

Very few of these young gentlemen were interested

in making the army a full-time professional occupation.

Some

■^^Dunlop, p. 197*
^"^Robert Blake, "Great Britain," Soldiers and Govern
m e n t s , ed. Michael Howard, (Bloomington:
Indiana University
Press, 1959), p. 27.
^■^Gordon, p. 77.
^•^•^Sheppard, p. i*75»
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officers of fashionable cavalry regiments spent as many as
250 days a year on leave, hunting, or engaged in other
sporting e v e n t s . ^ ^

Field-Marshal W a v e l l 1£ first request

to his Commanding Officer, when reporting to India as a young
subaltern, was for three m o n t h s 1 leave to go hunting; it was
granted*
Throughout the officer corps there seemed to be an
antipathy to theory and military education*

Gambling and

bibbing wine were more pleasurable occupations*

Few owned a

professional library•

At the War

Training was lacking.

Office the responsibility for training of troops was vested
in two junior officers.

116

The military education of the .

young officer at Sandhurst was also outdated*
Wavell,

Field-Marshal

looking back to his days at Sandhurst related:

We spent a lot of time doing sketches and in drawing
to scale diagrams of old-fashioned redoubts, lunettes,
etc*, which I suspect-were unchanged since Crimean
days.
On the other h and we learnt little tactics.M
The Staff College was scorned by most officers and only a
few competed for the thirty-two annual vacancies*

H 8

de Watteville, The British Soldier (New York:
G.F. F u t n a m 1s Sons, 1955)$ P* 205*
HU
,
John Connell, Wavell, Scholar and Soldier (New
York:
Harcourt, Bruce and. World., I n c * , 1964), p* 47•
•*--^de Watteville, p. 18.
•^^Robertson, Vol. I, p. 14*
■^•^Connell, pp* 38-39*

® Gardner, p* 14.
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These conditions h a d to be changed.

Fortunately,

a

new breed of officers was in evidence who were concerned with
the lack of staff education and training.

They did not share

the majority opinion that the army was a friendly club for
gentlemen, with facilities for polo and hunting.
Colonel William Robertson,

Lieutenant-

an officer who later became a

Field-Marshal, repeatedly bemoaned the lack of training of
both officers and men.

He was quite concerned over the lack

of skilled staff officers and the fact that few senior
commanders had attended the Staff College.11^
Bernard Montgomery,

then a young subaltern, was

disgusted with the senseless traditions which permeated the
Officers* Messes of the early 1 900*s. Compulsory drinking
I
particularly irked the young o f f i c e r H e was also disturbed
by the lack of professional military thinking and the attention
paid to senseless minutiae.

When given an oral examination

on mule transports, Montgomery was appalled at the questions
hH o w

many times in each 24 hours are the bowels of a mule

moved.?11

Ridiculous drill of this nature annoyed Montgomery

and many of the new breed of British officers serving their
apprenticeship in the post-Boer War days.

121

•^-^Victor Bonham-Carter, Soldier True (London:
Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1 9 ^ 3 )$ P • 47•
120sernard. Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of FieldMarshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G-. (Cleveland.s
The Wo r1d Publishing C o ., 195 $
P • 2 7•
12ljbid., pp. 28-29.
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Hie enlisted men of the army were of a different
category*

They were generally of a low class, many of them

illiterate*

Some were not even physically fit for strenuous

duty and others were barely a step ahead of the jailer*

122

The quality of the rank and file was slowly improving,
yet their education was still meager and many of them were
given to excessive drinking and gambling*

The middle class

of England considered it a disgrace to have a son in the army*
When William Robertson, later a Field-Marshal,
army as a private, his mother wrote him,

enlisted in the

,fI would rather

Bury fsicj you than see you in a red coat
These were the prevailing conditions*
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Xt was due to

the efforts of men like Robertson, Montgomery, Haig and
Allenby that the officers of the army were to become true
professionals, and that serving the colors became a respect
able career*

Meanwhile, however, the lack of professionalism

in the army provided another spur to the steed of reform*
The Aftermath
The period, of attempted army reforms serves to illus
trate the magnitude of the task which confronted Richard Haldane
whose reforms will be fully examined in the following chapters*
The army, weary of commissions,

committees, and rapidly changing

administrations, viewed every new reform proposal with suspicion*
122Amery, pp* 241-2^3*
3>23Bonham-Carter, p* 5»

The schemes of Brodrick and Arnold-Forster were still evident
- like shipwrecks - to serve as a warning of the perilous course
they sailed*

The public was either apathetic or interested in

a reduction in estimates*

The government wanted changes in

the army, but few were willing to vote the money to pay for
them*

Yet, progress had been made in the years that passed*

The War Office h a d been reorganized and the experiments and
"trials and errors" of two War Ministers were not without
value*
In any event,

the legacy of the Boer War and the

ill-fated, plans of Brodrick and Arnold-Forster provided the
backdrop and the illumination without which the Haldane reforms
cannot be properly evaluated.*

CHAPTER II
HALDANE ENTERS THE W AR OFFICE
A Government is Formed,
It was winter in England.
government was being Formed.

Hie year was 1905 and a new

Mr. B a l f o u r 1s Unionist govern

ment h a d resigned, and the King summoned Sir Henry CampbellBannerman,

the opposition leader,

to form a government.

Campbell-Bannerman immediately began to organize his cabinet.
The leadership of the Liberal Party was, however, not united.
There was a splinter group of the younger Liberals who were
primarily composed of three young Liberal Imperialists,
Edward Grey, H.H. Asquith and Richard Haldane.-1Foreseeing the fall of the Unionist government,

in

September 1 9 0 5 $ Herbert Asquith, Edward Grey and Richard
*

Haldane met and discussed the probability of Campbell-Bannerman
becoming Prime Minister.

In order to preserve the progressive

force in the Liberal Party, the trio resolved that
Campbell-Bannerman should take a peerage,

leaving Asquith

to lead the party in the House of Commons.

The three further

decided that unless Campbell-Bannerman would consent to this,
they would not enter the new government.
reached at a fishing lodge near Relugas,

This agreement was
Scotland,

and

^-Edward, G. Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (2 vol s.;
New York:
Frederick A* Stokes C o ., 1 9 2 5 )$ Vol. I, pp. 60-62*
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thereafter was referred to by the three conspirators as
,fThe Relugas Compact •1,2
The jnext step was to secure the cooperation of
King Edward VII.

On 12 September 1905* Haldane wrote

Lord Khollys a letter in which he explained the stand that
he, Asquith and Grey had taken.

He further pointed out that

they did not wish to cause embarrassment to the King, but
that action should be taken fairly soon.^

Lord Knollys

replied on 16 September that he personally agreed with the
views of Haldane and his colleagues; however, in the interests
of harmony, it might be more advantageous to allow CampbellBannerman to assume the Premiership and then retire to the
House of Lords after approximately one year's service.^
Haldane indicated to Lord Khollys that a six month to one year
waiting period would not be agreeable since a severe policy
5
split in the party could arise in that time period.
On
25 September, Lord Knollys Indicated his personal agreement
with Haldane's views and replied that he had shown the
2Richard B. Haldane, An Autobiography (Garden Cityi
Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1929)* pp. 169-171*
3 lb id .. pp. 171- 1 7 2 .
li
I b i d . Haldane indicates in his autobiography that
Knollys suggested a six or twelve month period for CampbellBannerman to lead in the Commons.
Maurice. Vol. I, p. 152,
reprints the Knollys letter which states,
• . . a certain
time, say a year for instance.11
*

^Haldane, p. 172.
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correspondence to the King who gave his approval.
On the ^th of October,

the King summoned Haldane to

Balmoral and. gave his blessing to the basic aims of the
"Relugas Compact."

It now remained for Asquith to inform

the aging, yet steadfast,

Campbell-Bannerman of the Relugas

ultimatum.^
On Monday, December 4, a day before B a l f o u r 1s resig
nation,

Sir Edward Grey visited Campbell-Bannerman and left

no doubt that unless Sir Henry would accept a peerage, he
JjStZQyJ would, not serve in the cabinet.

Campbell-Bannerman

7
was understandably hurt and. angry.' On the following day,
Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman kissed hands and. the King took
this opportunity to hint at a peerage because of the new
Prime Minister*s age and failing health.
however,

Campbell-Bannerman,

stated, his preference to begin his career as Prime

Minister in the House of Commons.®

On Wednesday,

December

6, Asquith went to see Campbell-Bannerman to plead the case
for Grey, Haldane and himself.

The Prime Minister remained

steadfast and indicated that he would, have to discuss the
matter with his wife.

After consultation,

the Campbell-

Bannermans decided, to refuse retirement to the House of Lords

6I b i d. , p. 173.
^Spender, Vol. II, pp. 193-19^
O
Haldane, pp. 180-181.
Campbell-Bannerman was so
distraught that he actually forgot to kiss the King*s hands,
a formal part of the ceremony• The King graciously considered,
it d o n e •

Uo
and advised Asquith accordingly.

Campbell-Bannerman then

made a counter offer; he tendered Asquith the post of
Chancellor of the Exchecquer and. authorized him to offer Grey
the Foreign Office and Haldane the Home Office.

Asquith

tried to convince the Prime Minister that Haldane would be
best fitted, for the "Woolsack."

This cabinet berth was not

available since Sir Robert Reid had already been selected
i
9
for the Lord. Chancellor s post.

The perspicacious Esher had

noted as early as October 6, that Haldane "• • . w a n t s to be
Chancellor, but the King - who would like it - says he has
no chance.

Reid will be preferred,.

• • •

Ihe Relugas Compact began to collapse on the 7th of
December when Asquith accepted, the Exchecquer post. A. The
negotiations, however,

continued and, later on Thursday,

the

Prime Minister offered the post of Attorney General to Haldane.
"The last thing that was likely to appeal £to Haldane^.
was the position of a Law Officer
that the Bar itself could give.

. . . /he"7 had had the best
TO
...
Haldane did not reply

•

immediately but sought out Lady Horner,
judgment he placed considerable v a l u e . ^
she answered*

. •

an old friend, on whose
To H a l d a n e 1s doubts

"The better for you to be a member of it

/the government^ “ 'the worse for the King and public who

^Ibid.
"The Woolsack" referred to the cushion upon
which the Lord, Chancellor was traditionally seated.
10Brett

(ed,), Vol. II, p. 115.

^■1Ibid. , Vol. II, p. 125.
^Haldane,

p. 182.

13Ibid., p. 181..
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cannot escape from it.
undecided.

it14

Haldane was impressed, but still

He then went to see Grey and urged him to join in

a consultation with Arthur Acland, a man whose advice they
mutually respected.

Acland. urged Haldane and Grey to join

the government because he believed that the two young states
men would, be able to do more for their party in the government
than on the sidelines.

Grey finally agreed with Haldane that

he would come into the cabinet provided Haldane would do so
also.*^

That same evening Haldane went to see the Prime

Minister and told him that he could, bring Grey into the
government but that he did. not want to be Attorney General.
Campbell-Bannerman then offered him the Home Office.
countered)

"What about the War Office?"

Campbell-Bannerman,
replied,

"Nobody," retorted

"will touch it with a pole."

"ihen give it to me.

Haldane

Haldane

I will come in as War Secretary

if Grey takes the Foreign Office.

• • ."^6

Friday morning, Grey accepted the Foreign Office
post.

The Relugas agreement was dead and. a fateful week came

to an end..

The government had. finally been f o r m e d . ^

lifI bid., p. 190.
1^I b i d . , pp. 184-185.

17

I b i d. « p. 194. ,Haldane later wrote that he felt
it was the K i n g 1s wish that he become War Minister; however,
the writer was unable to corroborate this with any other
source.
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There was no love lost between Campbell-Bannerman and
Haldane;

Sir Henry suspected, that Haldane was the instigator

of the Relugas Plot,

and. was wary of his new War Minister.

The War Office was considered, a grave for Parliamentary
ambitions and Campbell-Bannerman was reputed to have said,
"■We shall now see how Schopenhauer gets on in the Kailyard.."^®
On 11 December,

the new cabinet members went to the

palace to accept the seals of office.^9

xt was a foggy day

and, soon after the ceremony the new ministers became lost in
the murk.

Haldane finally groped his way to the War Office

and, exhausted,

asked, the guard for a glass of water.

"Certainly, Sir," came the alert reply,

"Irish or Scotch?"

2D

Thus began H a l d a n e fs auspicious career as Secretary
of State for War.
wrote,

"...

Congratulations poured, in.

Arnold-Forster

I see your appointment to the War Office with

deep satisfaction.

• • • I wish you every success.

i,p *i

King

l^i b i d . , p. 195•
Schopenhauer was a nickname Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman used for Haldane, referring to H a l d a n e 1s
translation of Schopenhauer's works into English.
Kailyard
was a term for barracks yard.
^ I t is interesting at this point to digress and consi
der the influence of women on the formation of this cabinet.
It is quite possible that this government would not have been
constituted, in the same format had it not been for the actions
of three women;
Lady Campbell-Bannerman definitely influenced
her husband to remain in the Commons, Spender, Vol. II, p. 195*
Lady Grey told, her husband., "if we had refused office, we could
not have justified the decision to the constituents," Grey,
Vol. I, p. 61.
There is also no doubt that Lady Horner's
advice had considerable influence on Haldane, Haldane, p. 190.
^°I b i d ., p. 1 9 6 .
^ Ar n o l d - F o r s t e r ,

Memoir, p. 297*
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Edward wrote,

"Mr. H a l d a n e ‘with sound common sense & great

powers of organizing ought to make an excellent War Minister,
which is much needed as his predecessor was hopeless.

h

22

The new War Minister soon met with his generals.

The

wary senior officers inquired as to Haldane's plans for the
army.

The witty War Minister quipped,

". . • 1 was as a

young and blushing virgin just united to a bronzed warrior,
and that it was not expected by the public that any result
of the union should appear until at least nine months had
passed .**23

xhe generals, having witnessed the army being

buffeted about by Haldane's two predecessors, were curious
about the new War Minister's aims and qualifications for of
fice.

Their attitude is quite understandable.

Richard Haldane's

credentials were bare of military experience and it would have
been difficult to find a minister with a lesser knowledge of
military concepts.
Haldane:

Scholar, Philosopher, Lawyer
Richard Burdon Haldane was born 30 July 18j>6 , in the

Haldane townhouse, a few steps from the house in Edinburgh
where five years later Douglas Haig was born.

24

The Haldanes

lived mostly in the Scottish countryside at Cloan and were a
close-knit, religious family.
22

Richard's father was a

Harold Nicholson, King George The Fifth, His Life and
Reign (Garden City:
Doubleday and" CoT," I nc ., 1953)V P« 93*
^ H a l d a n e , p. 1 9 6 .

24xerraine, p. 4.

44
moderately successful lawyer of some local repute.^5
Young Richard went to school in Edinburgh and when the
family was in residence in Cloan h a d a private tutor.
soon steeped in Latin, Greek and the classics.

He was

At sixteen

he entered, the University of Edinburgh and also studied at
the University of London.*
Even in those early days Haldane nurtured an interest
in philosophy and began to read voraciously of Hegel and other
German philosophers.
Blackie,

In 1874, one of his professors, J.S.

advised Richard to attend the University of Gottingen

to pursue his love of philosophy.

There is no doubt that the

early years in Gottingen had. a profound influence on the
young Haldane.

His spiritual and intellectual ties with

Germany were certainly formed in those student d.ays.^7
After five month's study, he returned to Cloan and
re-entered the University of Edinburgh.

His study of Kant,

Hegel and Fichte soon earned him his master's degree.

He

continued toward a doctorate in philosophy, but failed to
win approval of his thesis because the professor did not
i

concur with Haldane's doctrines.

2^Haldane, p. 4.
^ I bi d. , p.

7*

2 ^Ibid., pp. 13- 1 8 .

^ I b i d ., pp. 21-23*
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It was during these years that Haldane also grew in
physical stature*
by his brothers,

He was a devoted, walker,

a pastime shared

and. one time walked, seventy-three miles in

a day's t i m e .^3
It had been a foregone conclusion within the family that
Haldane would, follow his father's footsteps into the legal
prof e ssion and in 1879, h e entered L i n c o l n ' s Inn w h ere h i s
long legal career began.

Haldane was a careful and able

student endowed, with an exceptional m e m o r y , 30 yet in his
first year as a lawyer he earned only L31»10s.

By his fourth

year, however, he had progressed to an income of L 1 1 0 0 .

31

The young lawyer's reputation began to grow and soon Haldane
found himself swamped with cases.

He was highly regarded in

legal circles and was particularly successful with cases
involving colonial constitutional l a w . 32
At this point in his career Haldane also began to
enjoy the material fruits of his labors and he soon.became a
connoisseur of fine wines, excellent food and smoked, only the
best cigars.

33

In 1880, Haldane began his active interest in politics
and became associated, with the forerunner of the Liberal

2 9 i b i d . » PP* 10-11.
3°i b i d . , pp.

34-35*

31 l b i d . , p. 37*
^ I b i d . , pp. 46-4-7*
33pudley Sommer, Haldane of Cloan:
His Life and Times,
1856-1928 (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., i9 6 0 ) , p. 52*

be
Imperialist Party.

He became a member of the ''Eighty11 Club,

a group of young Liberals ‘who would meet from time to time to
4 discuss the political fortunes of the country.*^
met Herbert Henry Asquith.

In 1882, he

The two young men found many

mutual interests and a great friendship was formed.

In 1 8 8 5 ,

Richard Burdon Haldane stood for Parliament as a Liberal and
was elected from East Lothian,

a constituency which he

continued to represent until he was raised to the peerage in
1 9 1 1 .3 5

Edward Grey soon became a companion of Asquith,
Haldane and the group of young Liberals.

In 1886, Haldane

induced Asquith to stand for Parliament and he was subsequently
elected from a neighboring constituency of East F i f e .^6
The young politician began to broaden his social horizons
and soon was a welcome guest in the best salons of London
society.

Lawyer and politician,

first love, philosophy.

Haldane did not neglect his

He became an authority on

Schopenhauer and continued on summer trips to Germany to
further his research.

In 1903» Haldane was invited to deliver

the Gifford lectures at the University of St. Andrews, a
crowning tribute to Haldane's stature as a philosopher.3?
^ H a l d a n e , p. 8 6 .
35jbxd., p. 5 2 .
36I b i d .. p. 1 1 2 .
37 ibid.. p. 9 8 .

J+7
This was the Haldane who confronted the Generals:
skilled, lawyer,

a consummate politician and an avid philos

opher; a trained intellect,
capacity for w o r k .^8

a scholarly man with tremendous

A contemporary writer referred to him

as 11• • • an intellectual steam engine.11-^
an effective orator*
great detail*

a

Haldane also was

He was able to speak for hours and in

His speeches were likened to a 11* * * round

of beef - you may cut and come again.11^

As an administrator

Haldane had few peers.
This unique composite was Richard Haldane,
Secretary of State for War.

the new

Even though he was fated to

return to the highest position in the field of law before leav
ing public service, it was his work for the army that was to
bring him his most lasting fame; ironically,

the very field

for which his background and accomplishments seemed to fit
him least.
The Early Hays
Haldane immediately launched into the study of army
problems; his aim was first to win the confidence of his
generals,

select his staff,

and then cope with needed reforms.

Mr. Haldane did not enter the War Office with a pre-formed

3^Sommer, p. 102.
*^A.G. Gardiner, Prophets, Priests and. Kings (London:
Alston Rivers, Ltd., 19087, p. 20JI
*
^ Ibid.. H a l d a n e 1s speeches often lasted for many
hours.
He was not a demonstrative, emotional speaker.
His
legal training, however, was reflected in his ability to
speak logically and factually.
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plan.

His first task vias to seek out the experts to learn

from them the problems which confronted the War Office and
iii
the army.
Haldane soon met with the Chief of .Staff who
said to him,

nAt least, Mr. Secretary, you come to these

matters with a virgin m i n d .11

Haldane retorted,

"Yes, and

a virgin mind is better than Arnold-Torster1s immaculate
conceptions.

n42

The astute Esher predicted nThe new Secretary of State
cannot fail to do well, above all he has determined to walk
slowly and has no preconceived ideas.
and exceedingly clever.11^

He is adroit,

shrewd

Esher acted quickly and on the

day that Haldane accepted the seals of office, proposed
i
44
Colonel Gerald Ellison for the post of Haldane s Secretary.
Haldane readily admitted his ignorance of military affairs and
his need for a highly qualified officer to assist him.

He

wasted little time in accepting Colonel Ellison as his
Sec r e t a r y . 45

W h e n offered the post,

Ellison 11* . • asked at

once whether Mr. Haldane ha d any cut and, dried plans of his
own for the Army.
did not.
41

. . .11

Lord Esher assured him that Haldane

Ellison then offered to do whatever he could to

Robertson, Vol. I, p. 30.

^Sommer,
43B rett

p. 166.

(ed..), Vol. II, p. 132.

44jb id ., pp. 126-127.
Ellison had served as Secretary
of the Esher Committee and was most knowledgeable of army
affairs.

^Haldane, pp. 196-197*
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assist the new War M i n i s t e r . ^

Ellison and Haldane began a

close working relationship and the War Secretary commented,
"Ellison proved, to be all and more than all X had. hoped

The War Minister continued to build his staffs
Charles Harris became the he ad of the Financial Department
1,0

of the War Office;'4'0 Major General Spencer Ewart was trans
ferred to the War Office and became Director of Military
Operations;

and Major General Sir William Nicholson became

Quartermaster-General*

Major General Douglas Haig was

brought in later as Director of Military Training and
rounded out the team in April 1906.^°
Haldane then began an intensive course of study*
books of Bronsart von Schellendorf, Von der Goltz,

The

and

46

Ernest Merle Teagarden, "The Haldane Army Reforms,
1905-1912"(Unpublished. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History,
Western Reserve University, 1 9 6 2 ), pp. 41-42, citing Sir
Gerald. Ellison, "Reminiscences of Lieutenant-General Sir
Gerald Ellison," The Lancashire Lad, Journal of the Loyal
Regiment (North-Lancashire), XVXI (February 1936), p. 1.
^ H a l d a n e , p. 19748

I b id ., pp. 199-200.

49

John Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig (New York:
Charles Scribner *s Sons, 1 9 2 9 )> p^ JB"!
50

Terraine, pp. 39-40.
The caliber of officers serving
on this picked General Staff is reflected in the later careers
of these distinguished, officers.
Nicholson was destined to
become the first Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Haig
also won the Field-Marshall1s baton and led British Forces in
World War I; Colonels William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson,
who served on the staff, both became Chiefs of the Imperial
General Staff.
Actually, Ewart replaced Major General
Grierson as Director of Military Operations and Grierson took
command of the 1st Division of the British Expeditionary Force.
Charteris, p. 38, and Dunlop, p. 262.
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Clausewitz,

as well as the writings of Ardant du Ficq, were

closely studied, by the new War Minister who steeped himself in
the principles enunciated by these authorities of the military
prof;ession.^
The January elections were approaching and Haldane,
taking Ellison with him, wont home to Cloan to campaign for
re-election.

The two men continued their study of army

problems working in long sessions that often ended at one or
two o fclock in the morning.

"Hour after hour we would walk

backwards and forwards in a big billiard room, Mr. Haldane
on one side of the table smoking the best cigars procurable,
I on the other.

. ." wrote El li so n. ^

the problem to its simplest terms,
objective . . .

Haldane soon reduced

". • • What must be our

What was required for its attainment?

The Military Conversations of 1906
The January elections occupied the center stage while
a development of far-reaching consequences to H a l d a n e 1s plans
for the army was waiting in the wings.
On 12 January,

Sir Edward. Grey met Haldane at

•'^Haldane, p. 198.
Clausewitz, Von der Goltz and
du Picq were authorities and writers on military subjects.
Bronsart von Schellendorf *s book on the German General Staff
was considered a military classic.
-^Terrains, p. 39V quoting from Ellison, Lancashire Lad,
XVIX (February 1936), p. 1.

^Haldane, p. 200.
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Berwick.-^

He invited Haldane for a drive and informed the

War Minister that the french had indications of a possible
German Attack on France in the spring•

The question was,

Would England support France and had any discussion taken
place between the French and British staffs7
this news may have surprised. Grey and, Haldane,

Even though
the possi

bility of a war between France and Germany had been
explored by some of the army staff.
The assumption was made, that Britain would come to
the assistance of France.

The only question seemed to be

whether or not Germany would violate B e l gi um 1s neutrality.
However, E n g l an d1s participation in a French and German
conflict at that time generated only an academic i n t e r e s t * ^
Edward Grey did not have knowledge of any existing
plans between France and. England in the event of a German
threat,nor

is there any evidence that Haldane was anything

•5^There seems to be a difference of opinions among
historians whether this meeting took place on 12 January or
13 January.
Maurice, Vol. XI, p. 261, states it was
the twelfth; Dunlop, p. 2 3 6 , places the meeting on January
13> Grey, p. 73» and Haldane, p. 202, indicate only that the
meeting took place between 10 January and 15 January.
Even
though the date is not firmly established by British
documents, an analysi s of other happenings indicates that
12 January was the most probable date.
^Haldane,

pp.

^Robertson,
•57g t ey, p.

202-203.

Vol. I, pp. 2i*-26 .

72.
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but surprised on that January day.
Haldane also received the following letters
My dear Richard,
Persistent reports and little indications
keep reaching me that Germany means to attack
France in the spring.
I don*t think these are
more than the precautions and flourishes that
Germany would naturally make apropos of the
Morocco Conference.
But they are not altoget
her to be disregarded.
A situation might arise
presently in which popular feeling might com
pel the Government to go to the help of France
and you might suddenly be asked what you could
do.
Fisher says he is ready, by which I take
it he means that his ships are so placed that
he can drive the German Fleet off the sea and
into shelter at any time.
X d o n ft want you
to give any definite answer in a hurry but X
think you should be preparing one.
Yours ever,
E. Grey*58
Actually the pot had begun to boil earlier.

On 28 December

t
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington, the military
correspondent of the Times was approached by Major Huguet,
the French military attache, who expressed some concern as
to what the attitude of England*s new government would be
in the event of an attack on France by Germany.

Repington

immediately passed this information on to Grey.

The Foreign

Minister replied that he did not disavow any agreements
Lord Lansdowne, his predecessor, may have ha d with the
^ Maurice, Vol. I, pp. 172-173.
This letter indi
cates a considerable lack of coordination between the War
Office, the Admiralty and Foreign Office on matters of
contingency planning to support political aims.
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French.
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Repington then consulted with Esher and Clarke

of the Imperial Defense Committee.

They suggested that

Repington prepare a short list of questions concerning
Anglo-French military cooperation and submit them to Major
Huguet.

Lieutenant-Colonel Repington did so and returned

the French answers to the oomraittoe on 12 J a n u a r y . ^
On 10 January,

Sir Edward Grey recorded a discussion

with the French Ambassador, Mr. Paul Cambon, who intimated
”• • • that he did not believe that the German Emperor de
sired war but • • • was pursuing a very dangerous policy.
Cambon further iterated that,

”lt was not necessary . . .

there should be any formal alliance . . .

that

the French govern

ment should / S oiwever7 know beforehand whether

. ..

Great

Britain would be prepared to render France armed assistance.”
Grey retorted that in his personal opinion,

62

” . . • England.

would be strongly moved, in favour of France,” in the event
of a German attack on France.
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Grey also suggested that

59

Great Britain, British Documents on the Origin of the
War, 1898- 191^ (eds.) G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, Vol. Ill;
The Testing of the Entente, 190^-1906 (London:
His M a j e s t y 1s
Stationery Off i c e , 1 9 2 8 ), p. I 6 9 , hereafter cited "British
Documents.”
60I b i d .
^ I b i d . , p. 170.
Sir F. Bertie.
62Ibid.
6 3 Ibid.

Letter from Sir Edward Grey to

5k
unofficial planning between the War Office and the French
representatives should take place.
On 11 January, Major-General Grierson was queried on
the matter of Anglo-French military commitments.

He

immediately urged that exploratory conversations between the
British and French General Staffs be conducted provided, the
British government would not be committed to any specific
action.&k
These were the events which ha d passed prior to
Grey and Haldane*s meeting during their election respite.
The Foreign and War Ministers agreed that before anything
further could be done the Prime Minister should be consulted.
Haldane then left for London and conferred with CampbellBannerman, ^3 -who ordered, that it be made absolutely clear
that the conversations between the General Staffs should be
noncommittal and that the government would not be bound by
them.
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On 15 January,

staff conversations were officially

authorized with Major-General Grierson representing the
British government.

Again,

everyone involved was careful

to state that neither government would be c o m m i t t e d . ^
Haldane also directed Major-General Grierson to initiate a
study to determine the best means of supporting the French

6**T b i d .. pp. 171-173*
Memorandum by Lord Sanderson
to E. Grey, and letter from Major-General J.M. Grierson
to Lord Sanderson.
^ H a l d a n e , p. 2 0 3 *
6 6 Spender, Vol. XX, p. 253.
^7Great Britain, British Documents. Vol. Ill, p. 177*
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mxlitary •
Haldane immediately recognized this as a new problem
for the army.

Time requirements for mobilization and tbe

size of a striking force became immediate considerations.
After all, Britain 11♦ • • had never contemplated the
preparation of armies for warfare of the Continental t y p e . " ^
Matters continued, to progress rapidly.
On 16 January,
Barnardistpn,

Grierson wrote Lieutenant-Colonel

the British attache in Belgium,

11• • • we are

prepared, to put in the field., • ♦ • L Cavalry Brigades, 2 Army
Corps and a division of mounted infantry* . • • The total num
bers will be about 105 thousand.

• •

Grierson*s

estimate proved to be somewhat optimistic.

As the British

Staff began to evaluate their resources, the estimate of
available force was reduced, to 80,000 m e n * ^

The British

military structure was not capable of supporting a larger
requirement at the time.

There was one Army Corps at Aider-

shot j the remainder of the Regular Army was organized at the

68Haldane, p. 20L.
69
Richard B, Haldane, Before the War
Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 31*

70

(London:

Great Britain, British Documents, Vol. Ill, p. 179*

^ M a u r i c e , Vol, XI, p. 262.

Battalion and Regimental level and few units of Brigade
size existed.

There was a shortage of horses, men, artil

lery and ammunition and the Auxiliaries were more than
somewhat d i s o r g a n i z e d « ^

The best estimate for placing this

force of 80,000 men into the field was two months.
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Sir

Edward Grey, informed that 30,000 men were all that was
available,

commented,

ft. • • That w o n ’t save France unless

she can save h e r s e l f .
The need, for a British Expeditionary Force was with
out a doubt established.

The military conversations were

the genesis of the Expeditionary Force.

The new Ttfar Minister

had received his “Marching Orders."

^Robertson,

Vol. I, pp. 27-28.

^ H a l d a n e , Before the W a r , p. 32.
7L
Great Britain, British Documents, Vol. XXX, p. 178.
Letter from Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

CHAPTER III
CREATION OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
The Beginnings
The Liberals*

resounding victory at the

polls'*' ■

enabled Haldane to devote all his energy to the matter
at hand - army reform.

The military conversations added,

a pressing urgency and Haldane applied himself to the prob
lem of providing, a striking force for the British Army.
He -was, however,
tions;

faced with several political considera

the victorious Liberals h a d little interest in the

army.
money
budget.^

The resounding cry was for social reform and the
for these plans would have to come from the army
,fArmy Estimates as in 18991*1 was another

popular slogan.^

Haldane was cautioned,

great improvements.

**Do not attempt

The attempt will fail.

yourself on reducing the estimates.1*
War Minister countered,

To this the astute

“. . • that economy and efficiency

were not incompatible.

■^Haldane, An Autobio graph y , p. 22h„
^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 178.
^Terraine,’ p. 38.
^Haldane,

But concentrate

An Autobiography, p. 199*
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With these political realities firmly in mind
Haldane began to carve out the foundation of the Expedi
tionary Force.
■was determined.

Aided, by Ellison and Harris,

an objective

German sea power was growing,

and. the

spectre of a Continental war was visible in the far-off
distance.

The seeds for an England committed to aid an

embattled France had already been sown.

An expeditionary

force which could be mobilized quickly to succor a French
army in the event of German attack t\ras, therefore,

a prime

consideration.*^
*

This striking force, of course, did not exist.
". . • Hardly a brigade could have been sent to the
Continent without being rec a st.11
artillery,
force.
7
time •

Nor was there sufficient

transport, or medical support to employ a sizable

Fifteen days %i?ere considered the maximum mobilization

The energetic War Minister consulted with his
generals and worked ceaselessly.
Haldane,

The hard work agreed with

"l am enjoying myself h u g e l y , M he wrote,

"The work

of thinking out and. executing organisation delights me.
g
Generals are like angels."

My

•5Ibid.., p. 200.
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court
Repington claims predit for coining the term, "Expeditionary
Force."
Charles a Court Repington, The First World War,
191^-1918 (2 vols.j Londons
Constable and Company, Ltd.,
1920), Vol. I, p. 1U.
/T
Haldane, An Autobiography, p. 201.
7Ibid.

^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 171.
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A formula soon began to emerge and a general outline
of the Expeditionary Force was completed on 29 January
1906.9

The Expeditionary Force would, consist of six large

infantry divisions and one cavalry division.
was to be augmented by artillery,

ordnance,

This force
supply, medical,

and support units.
While Haldane worked on the army problem,
for a reduction in estimates swelled;
had to be placated.

the cry

the radical Liberals

Haldane was an astute politician and,

would not be rushed into making precipitate plans or render
hasty judgments.

This was demonstrated in his speech

delivered in Parliament on 8 March 1906, which opened the
debate on the 1906-1907 estimates.
campaign with the utmost prudence,

Launching his army reform
caution,

and, modesty,

the

War Minister began:
. . . I address the House wi th unfeigned diffidence.
My predecessors, or many of them, have been people
of great military knowledge.
Never did a Minister
rise to address this House on subjects connected
with his Department with less preposition.
Whether
that is a merit or not, it has at least enabled me
to approach the consideration of the questions
which I had to face in the beginning of last Decem
ber with an open m i n d . H
The address continued, for nearly three hours.

Haldane deftly

^Teagarden, "The Haldane Army Reforms, 11 p« 6 0 , citing
a letter from Haldane to his mother, Haldane Pap er s.
•^Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 201-202.
^^Richard B. Haldane, Army Reform and Other Addresses
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), pi 51 hereafter cited as
"Army Reform."
This speech may also be found, in Pari. D e bs .,
4, CLIII (1906).
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expounded his reform philosophy,

at the same time insured

that his colleagues understood that these were merely ideas
and that time was needed for a full study of the problem.
He paid, tribute to the "• » • New school of young officers.
• . •

it12

He defined the financial problems of the army and

the many necessary expenditures which he had inherited due to
existing army p o l i c i e s . ^

The costs of maintaining a soldier

in the colonial garrisons also were evaluated;

the annual cost

of maintaining a soldier serving in South Africa was

150,

1U

a substantial amount of money in 1906.
Haldane did not fail to pledge his allegiance to the
"Blue-Water Principle" for the defense of England.
•

#•

Reductions were necessary to lower the estimates.
Shore defenses came under H a l d a n e ,s fire and were marked for
elimination since the navy was considered fully capable of
defending England.1s c o a s t s . ^

The wastage of unused stores

had been discovered by H a l d a n e ts probing eye and large stocks
of obsolete equipment were to be disposed of.
regiment at Wei-hai-wei,

A native

China, x$hich cost L20,000 a year

•^Haldane, Army R e f o r m , p. 4.
13I bi d., pp. 4-5.
ljjT b i d ., p. 9 *

L 150 equated to approximately $6 0 0 .

'•^I b i d .3 pp. 13-15*
cf. Maurice Vol. I, p. 179*
The Blue-Xtfater Doctrine placed primary reliance on the navy
to protect England from invasions, thereby reducing the
need for a large "Home Army."

•^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 14.
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upkeep and served no useful purpose, was also sacrificed, on
the altar of economy* ^
Haldane then proceeded to provide a masterful insight
to his philosophy and military concepts.

Contrasting the

military problem of Great Britain to that of other nations
he proclaimed:
They have only one war to contemplate on a large
scale, and that is with their neighbors across
the border.
They have to be ready to mobilise
and to fight within perhaps ten days from the
time of the order being given.
Therefore they
must be ready.
It is absolutely necessary that
their reserves should be trained up to the eyes
and ready when called upon to take the field, at
once.
But the British Army is not like that.
We live on an island, and, our coasts are completely
defended, by the Fleet.
Our Army is wanted for pur
poses abroad and. over-seas.
It is necessarily a
professional Army; we could not get such an Army
by conscription’
. It must be of high quality; but
because of the limited nature of its functions
-- to strike at a distance -- it ought to be of
strictly limited dimensions.
Have we ever thought,
scientifically and clearly, what these dimensions
ought to be?
X do not think so.
I know that
certain things have been worked out, but X do not
think the whole problem has been dealt with in its
entirety. Here is an island, the striking force of
which does not exist for the defence of these
coasts — it does not exist merely for our own
insular interests.
This*island is the centre of
an Empire consisting of nearly 12,000,000 square
miles and including some ^0 0 ,000,000 of population,
and we have to protect the distant shores of that
Empire from the attack of the invader.
We want,
therefore, an Army which is very mobile and. capable

17Ibid., p. 18
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of rapid transport*
For fighting which has to b©
at a distance and, cannot be against large masses
of men it ought to be upon a strictly limited
scale, and perfect rather in quality than expanded,
in quantity.
There never has been enough careful
thinking about this problem.
If the Army is not
■wanted, for home defence, then its size is something
which is callable of being calculated.
The size of
the expeditionary force is the principal ingredient
in the present cost of the Army.-^
The War Minister only cursorily touched on militia and volun
teer problems; however, he recommended that they should, be
drawn closer to the Regular

A

r

m

y

.

He also pointed out the

necessity

of education for British officers

and

advanced the

idea of a

degree in military s c i e n c e . H e ended his excel

lent speech with this disarming comments
I have outlined no scheme tonight — I have merely
thrown out ideas which have resulted from such study
as I have so far made of the subject.
I may be
wrong in thinking that progress is possible
along
those lines; but I do not think I am.^l
Haldane did not hesitate to warn his colleagues,
not force me to handle the Army rapidly.

Do not force upon

me things which I could not do and which I would
resign my office than try to do.

nDo

rather

• • •

The blueprint of the Haldane reforms

was firmly drawn

and the faction pressing for a lowering of the estimates had
•j O

Ibid.,
pp. 2lh-25.
cf. Dunlop, p. 2^9; Maurice,
Vol. I, p . l&oj and Pari. Debs . , %, CLIII (1906), pp. 673675.
■^Haldane, Army R e f o r m , pp. 28-29*
20 I b i d . , p. 3 6 .
2 lI b i d . , p. 38.
22Ibid.
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been masterfully placated with, a reduction of L 17,000 from
the preceding army budget.2 ^
Launching the Expeditionary Force Scheme
There was some grumbling opposition from both the
Conservative and Liberal benches.
a stalwart of the Opposition,

H.O.

Arnold-Forster, now

objected to Haldane's plan for

augmenting and expanding the Regular Army in time of war.
The ex-War Minister contended that his scheme of a Home Army
was far superior.

oh,

Balfour pointed out that a reduction of
r

troops was not compatible with the theory of an expandable
army.2^
Rumors of impending troop reductions were soon rife
in the House of Commons and. at Edward.1s Court.
of ten infantry battalions,

A rumored cut

a substantial number of artil

lery batteries and a reduction in colonial troops readily
gained, currency.

26

Viscount Esher,

the loyal watchdog of

the army, wrote the King on 1 April 1906, concerning the
proposal to reduce the guards, and. picturesquely pointed
out,

,jTo reduce the Guards Brigade at Aldershot is to knock

the point off the spear and to blunt the weapon.

• . .

,,27

2 ^Ibid., p. 6.
cf.
Maurice, Vol. I, p. 181.
The
1905-1906 army expenditure was £.28,4*78,863.
The Liberals
were expecting a reduced estimate of £25*000,000.
However,
they had to be satisfied with a reduction of £17*000.
2^Parl. Debs., 4, CLXV (1 9 0 6 ), cf.
Memoir, pp. 301-306.

Arnold-Forster,

25parl« Debs., h, CLIV (1906), p. H*6l.
^Maurice,

Vol. 1, p. 182.

S^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 156-157.

6k
He further related that he had. discussed this matter with
Mr. Haldane and hoped for the best.

Nor did the King hesi

tate in advising the War Minister of the Royal objections to
og
a reduction of the South African garrison.
On this point,
however, ‘Esher was able to assure his sovereign that if
reductions of infantry were to bo made in South Afrioa,

the

units would, be replaced, by cavalry. 29
The possibility of a reduction in artillery also
drew the fire of two ex-War Ministers, now turned, critics.
Mr. Brodrick and Mr. Arnold-Forster both considered artil
lery a necessary ingredient in E n g l a n d fs army, the reduction
of which they considered a national calamity.

30

On 12 July, Mr. Haldane was ready to place his pro
posals before Commons.;

The House was packed,

the galleries

crowded,

as he rose to speak.

modesty;

confidence and assurance were the keynotes as Haldane

began on a somber note,

31

This time there was no polite

"i believe there is hardly a

Member who is not highly convinced that the state of our
national Forces is profoundly unsatisfactory•
ment referred both to cost and to organization.

This state
Haldane

pointed out the need to H. • • restore public confidence in
28Lee, Vol. II, pp. 4*84*-4*8.5.
29Brett

<ed.), Vol. II, p. 15^.

^Maurice,

Vol. I, p. 183*

-^Dunlop, p. 253*
Army R e f o r m , p. 4*1. This speech is also
quoted in its entirety in P a r i . Debs., k, CLX (1906), pp.
3 2Hald.ane,

1079-H20 •
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the Army*

• • ,

and to make people realize that in their

army they are getting fair value for their money*

The Army

must be reorganized, so that it can be efficiently used in
war*

M • • • An Army shaped, for the only purpose for which an

Army is needed - the purpose of war."*^*

This was Haldane's

stated purpose as he began to unfold his plan*

He

acknowledged the compatibility of economy and efficiency,
yet each officer,

each soldier,

each piece of equipment had

to be measured by the yardstick of its value and contribution
for w a r . ^

The War Minister also made it clear that the

Regular Army's purpose was for war overseas.

The fleet was

charged with defense of English c o a s t s . ^
The Plan is Unveiled ;
Haldane then unveiled his plan for the Expeditionary
Force;

the result of four months'

study.

He proposed, an

organization of six large infantry divisions,
support forces;

four cavalry brigades;

and artillery.

force of one hundred fifty thousand men,

^Haldane,

Army R e f o r m , p. 4*1.

^ X b i d . , p. 4*3#
3-5I b i d . , p. 4*6.
^^Xbid.

complete with
A

composed of fifty
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thousand Regulars,

seventy thousand Reservists and thirty

thousand Militia was required to man this organization.-^
Haldane*s basic aim was to man the Expeditionary Force with
the required infantry,
services;

artillery,

cavalry, and support

abolish whatever troops proved excess,

the monetary surplus to lower the estimates.

and use

Only cavalry

units were to be excepted from planned r e d u c t i o n s . ^
Artillery was the next consideration.

Even though

there were ninety-three batteries of field artillery in
existence,

sufficient manning was available to mobilize* only

forty-two of them.

The new quick-firing guns required, larger

amounts of ammunition to support them and no provision had
been made for this.

The state of artillery was an inheritance

from Mr. Haldane 1s two predecessors who complained most
loudly about artillery r e d u c t i o n s . ^
Sixty-three artillery batteries with ammunition
columns were required, to support the Expeditionary Force.
^ Xbid., p. 5^*
Haldane* s plan for the Expeditionary
Force was without doubt based on the Cardwell system of
"linked battalions."
Haldane used a twelve-battalion In
fantry Division as his base organization.
There were suf
ficient Infantry Battalions in England, to provide six
divisions leaving a surplus of eight battalions.
By 1909,
the War Minister perfected the Cardwellian equation, return
ing eleven battalions from overseas garrisons to England.
This leveled the force to seventy-four battalions at home and
a like number in the colonies.
E.G. Grey, et a l ., Vi scount
Haldane of Cloan, P.M., The Man and His Work (London:
Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 11-12,
hereafter cited as "Viscount Haldane."
-^Haldane, Army Re fo rm , p. 55* cf. Dunlop, p. 255,
and Sommer, p. 173*
39

^
Haldane, Army Reform, pp. 5o“57*
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To fully man these batteries, Haldane proposed, the dissol
ution of the Militia Royal Garrison Artillery.

The transfer

of the coast defense mission to the Navy made this artillery
arm surplus.

Thirty-six additional batteries -would be

formed to provide training and reserve function.
guns were to be issued to Volunteers,
from previous c o n c e p t s . ^

The older

a significant departure

In addition,

ten horse artillery

batteries were slated to join the Expeditionary force
providing a total of seventy-three artillery batteries for
H a l d a n e 1s envisioned, “strike F o r c e . 1’
structure,

The revamped artillery

claimed Haldane, would reduce estimates by

L300,000 a n n u a l l y . ^
Disposing of the artillery problem, the War Minister
turned to the infantry.

Seventy-two infantry battalions were

required for the proposed six divisions.
furnish six battalions;

The Guards would

the remaining sixty-six battalions

were to be provided from the Infantry of the L i n e . - i f r ©
eight surplus battalions of the Line and two Guard battalions
hk
*
were to be disbanded.
Haldane s plan further provided for
the withdrawal of three infantry battalions from South Africa

^ I b i d ., pp. 62-63*
^ I b i d . , p. 6 6 .
^ I b i d ., p. 6 3 *
^ I b i d ., pp. 65- 6 6 .
^ I b i d . , p. 7 2.
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to be replaced by a cavalry regiment.
The Line Infantry Regiments identified for dissolu
tion were the
Third and fourth battalions of the Northumberland
Fusiliers, the third and fourth battalions of the
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, the third and, fourth
battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the
third and fourth battalions of the Manchester
R e g i m e n t . ^

The Guard battalions to be disbanded were the third, battalion
of the Scots Guards and the 3d Coldstrearns
Mr. Haldane also clarified his policies on enlistment.
The Infantry term of service would be seven years with the
colors, and five with the Reserves;
tinue to serve three and nine;
obligated to seven and five.

the Guards would con

and the Cavalry soldier was
Artillery units would serve for

six years with the colors and six in the Reserves with the
exception of Garrison Artillery, which would, be enlisted, for
a term of eight and four years.

L8

Having completed his recommendations for the Regular
components of the army, Haldane proceeded to discuss the
^ I b i d . , p. 7 6 .
U6

Ibid., p;. 77*
All of these units were considerably
under-strength. The eight battalions combined were nearly
1200 men short.
^^ I b i d ., pp. 75-76.
The 3d Coldstreams were not to
be disbanded until a tour of duty in Egypt was completed.
Later considerations saved this battalion from dissolution.
^ I b i d . ,

p.

78.
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Auxiliary Force.

Hie Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry -were

to be measured with the same yardstick as the Regular Army,
"What purpose do you serve in w a r ? " ^
The Auxiliaries had become an expensive luxury
during the last ten years.

The Militia had decreased in

strength to ninety thousand men, yet its annual cost had
increased, by £,**30,000o

The Yeomanry, now numbering 25*000,

had, more than doubled, during the same period and cost an
additional £,**20,000 a year.^®
down the gauntlet,
work . . .

To the Militia, Haldane threw

". • • Either fall back into Volunteer

or else they must take upon themselves the same

obligation as the regular soldier • • * to serve abroad in
time of viar."^
defined:

Ihe functions of the Volunteers were also

to man the coastal defenses when Regular troops

went to war,

to repel raids,

for the Regular A r m y . ^
Regular Army,

and to act as a pseudo-reserve

Firm in his proposals for the

the shrewd War Minister w a s not yet ready to

fully outline his plans for the Auxiliary Forces,

HWe are

still in a state of consideration about the Auxiliary
• •

Haldane stated.

^ 9Ibid., P*

00
ro
•

Forces.

'50Ibid. , P* 8 3 .
•^1Ibi d ., p. 84.
*52I b id ., P* 8 7 .
•
Q\

CM

^ I b i d . # p.

An army of greater strength
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at a lesser cost was the ultimate goal./'***
Action and Reaction
The speech was a success.
disorganized.

Opposition was light and

Balfour was instrumental in restraining some

of the Opposition when he stated,

"We had failed to ijroduee

an a c c e p t a b l e ,scheme of Army reform.

Haldane must be given

his chance.11^
There was, h o w e v e r , ,a conservative attempt to block
H a l d a n e 1s program.

On 19 July, F.E. Smith arose in the House

of Commons and moved for adjournment, based on 11• • . the
avowed, intention of His M a j e s t y 1s government to commence
forthwith reductions in His M a j e s t y 1s armed forces which have
not received the sanction of Parliament•
by the opposition was firmly defeated.
nThe politicians . . .

This attempt

Lord Esher recordsj

debated his ^/Haldane fjs7 breeches of

faith, and other silly political shibboleths,

fixing as

politicians always do on immaterial points.
Haldane had placated his party with reductions in the
army.

He fought now with closed ranks, and the opposition

•^ I b i d . , p. 9 3 .
■^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 183.
•56Parl. D e b s . , U, CLX (1 9 0 6 ), p. 2*18.
■^Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, pp. 171-172.
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crumbled,.

It was time to translate theory into reality.

Haldane published his Memorandum on Army Reorganization
on 30 July.

This memorandum contained,, in essence, the main

points of his 12 July speech.
changes.

There were, however,

a few

In his speech Haldane had referred to a Militia

elements of thirty thousand, men to round out the Expeditionary
Force;

this force was now displaced by 3*240 Yeomanry,

Artillerists,
personnel.
addition,

10,337

2,425 Engineers and 10,775 Army Service Corps

These were all referred to as "non-Regular."

In

there were some 4,000 medical, veterinary and

ordnance personnel.

Also, the memorandum clarified the

position of Militia Infantry.

Battalions of Militia In

fantry were to be trained as units and it was hoped that they
<58
would, be sent overseas in that configuration.-^
Haldane wisely elected to enact his proposals for the
Expeditionary Force without legislation.-^^

The actual

reductions were implemented by Army Order 235 on 1 October.
With, the aid of Haldane's staff, Ellison,
Generals Douglas and. Haig,

Nicholson, Ewart,

the British Expeditionary Force

became a reality on 12 January 1907* by Special Army Order
which established the new organization.^0
58

Dunlop, pp. 259-260,

citing Command Paper 2993

of 1 9 0 6 .
•^I b i d ., p. 26l.

60

Ibid.,

see Appendix A.
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Haldane had, accomplished the first milestone in his
plan for the reform of the British Army.

The Expeditionary

Force was assembled and trained in the three year period, that
followed.

A small force by Continental standards,

the

British Expeditionary Force was honed into a high quality
professional fighting unit.

In 1914, when the call came, the

British Expeditionary Force was deployed to France in the
planned period of twelve days.

6l

It was on French soil that the f,01d ContemptiblesH
earned the respect of friend and foe alike, and in their
blood etched the word Valor into the tableau of British Army
history.

61 Grey, e t a l . , Viscount Haldane, p. .11

CHAPTER IV
THE FORMATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Antecedent s
Haldane is often credited with the creation of the
British General Staff*

It would be more accurate, however,

to state that Haldane translated theories into practice
because it was he who made the General Staff a functioning
body and furnished Britain* s army with a "Thinking
•I

*

Department* 11
General Staffs, in some form, have existed as long
as there have been armies.

Julius Ceasar was surrounded, by

a group of generals and. aides who transmitted and carried
out his orders;

Alexander the Great had, a staff of sorts;

Frederick the Great had an extremely efficient staff system;
and Napoleon Bonaparte had an excellent staff headed by the
famous General Berthier*

p

It was, however,

the Prussians

who created, a General Staff along modern lines and used it as
an instrument of victory*

The German successes of 1870 were

directly creditable to the brilliance and the organizational
capability of the Prussian General Staff.^

•^Haldane, Army R e f o r m , p. 23*
2 Gord.on, p. 95»
^Ibid*, p. 9 6 .
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The French, who

7h
foil victim to t h i s .splendid organization, immediately took
*
Ll
steps to create a similar General Staff, The Etat-Major.
Nor vias the staff idea entirely new in Britain.

As

early as l 6 h 5 9 a Headquarters Staff headed by a Commanderin Chief was in existence.

This group consisted of a

small number of officers and civilians who represented basic
military support functions,

such as Supply, finance, Judge

Advocacy, Chaplaincy, Administration,

and Medicine.-^

Wellington also possessed an efficient and well
organized staff; however,

the staffs of the early British

Army were primarily composed of specialists and did not
function as either a planning or a policy-making organization.^
Nor is there evidence that any selection criteria was ap
plied in order to obtain the best possible officers to
serve in staff capacities.

A Commander often selected his

staff from his circle of friends or members of his family, who
were personally congenial and not necessarily had ability to
perform their duties.^
The first concrete proposal for a British Staff formed
along modern lines was made in I89O by Lord Hartington in his
report on the findings of the Hartington Commission.

He

^Ibid.
•5j .D. Hittle, Hie Military Staff, Its History and
Development (Harrisburg:
The Military Service Publishing
Co., 1 9 ^ 1 7 p. 11^.
6I b i d ., pp. 123-125.
^Sheppard., p. 481#
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recommended the creation of a General Staff headed by a Chief
of Staff and organized in a manner similar to the staffs then
o

existing m
tunately,

the armies of major European powers.

Unfor

this report was weakened by a strong conservative

attitude prevalent in the army of Victoria.

The Duke of

Cambridge was distrustful of any reform or change in the
existing army and the aging queen shared and. supported his
opinions.9

The strength of Ha rt i n g t o n 1s recommendation was

further diluted by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who, as a
member of the Hartington Commission,

submitted a dissenting

minority report.
There were, however, individuals who realized
Britain's desperate need for a General Staff organized along
German lines.

On the^same day that the Hartington Commission

Report was signed,

Spenser Wilkinson published his book,

The Brain of an A r m y .^^

Mr. Wilkinson explained the

workings of the General Staff system in detail but more than
that he grasped the importance of organized command, trans
lated into effective and efficient application of military
power.

The book served, to popularize the General Staff

concept among both civilians and military officers.

12

The

o

Amery, pp. 292-293*
Xn Appendix F of his book,
Amery has reprinted a sizable extract from the Hartington
Commission report.
9 Supr a, p. 1 6 .
10Amery, pp. 293-29^.
~
"^Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (2d. ed.;
London:
Constable and Co., L t d . , 1 9 1 3 )$ P * 5*
.

12Hittle, pp. 132-133.
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great German General, Moltke,
mere civilian,

expressed, surprise that a

and an Englishman at that, was able to capture

and aptly describe the functioning of the General Staff
system. ^
The influence of The Brain of an Army was not limited
to England.

Some of the roots of the American General Staff

can also be traced, to Wilkinson's w or k. 1**

The title, The

Brain of an A r m y , was particularly appropriate since the
German General Staff was indeed the intellect of German
military p o w e r . ^
The German Model
The history of the Prussian staff can be traced to
1655, when the Qreat Elector of Brandenburg appointed a
Generalquartiermeister.

This officer's position was similar

to that of a Chief of the General Staff, however, he was not
charged with the manifold, responsibilities which were later
attached to this post.

In 1796, a Cartographic Section was

attached to the staff and other military functions were
added, as they were found necessary to provide coordinated
staff action. ^

In 1815, the German Staff was divided into

two separate parts.

Per Grosse Generalstab functioned at

Berlin while the remaining Truppen-Generalstab served with
■^Wilkinson, pp. 9-11*
lJ*Hittle, p. 178.
1-5X b i d . , pp. 131-132.
Ig
|
Charles a Court Repington, Imperial Strategy
(London:
John Murray, 1906), p. 137*
17I bi d. . p. 1 3 8 .
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the troops.

18

At first there was only a limited number of

officers serving in this select organization.

During the

tenure of General Muffling, who served as Chief of the German
General Staff from 1821 to 1 8 2 9 $ only forty-six officers
served with this elite group.
against France,

In 1870, when Germany mobilized

the staff had increased to 109 officers,19

and, by 1 890 , the Prussian General Staff had grown to a total
of 200 officers.

Ninety of these served with staffs of the

divisions in the Army Corps whereas the remainder were
members of the Great General Staff at B e r l i n .^0
The German staff corps was an aristocracy of talent
in every respect.

They were an elite group separate from the

remainder of the army, wearing distinctive uniforms,

special

insignia and their accelerated promotions issued directly from
the Chief of Staff of the Army.^-*for duty with the General Staff.

Only the elite were chosen
Each year only the top

handful of graduates of the ICriegs Akademie
were selected for duty with the Staff.

(Staff College)

After a y e a r ’s ser

vice, these junior officers were returned to their regiments
and continued rotating between staff and regimental
«L8

Ibid.. . Per Grosse Generalstab is translated literally
as the great general staff.
Per Truppen-Generalstab translates
general staff of troops.
19I b i d . , p. 1 3 9 .
^ W i l k i n s o n , p. 13^»
21

Ibid., pp. 131-133
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assignments as long as they showed p r o g r e s s . ^
There is no doubt that Per Grosse Generalstab
represented the epitome of organized military command function
in the early 1900*s.

However, neither Wilkinson nor members

of the British military wanted an exact replica of the German
Staff;

rather,

they wanted a staff tailored to British needs

incorporating certain German c o n c e p t s . ^

Xt remained for the

investigations which followed, the South African War to provide
the spur for further action.

The Esher Committee reported

that the lack of planning, of preparation and of trained,
staff officers during the Boer campaign ,f. . . gravely
prejudiced the conduct of operations in South Africa.
Viscount E s h e r fs reconsideration to replace the office of
Commander-in Chief with a General Staff began a ripple of
change in the “ostrich l i k e ” attitude of the War Office.
The General Staff
In December of 1903* Viscount Esher advised Prime
Minister Balfour,

MIf Arnold-Forster is wise he

• • • will

throw all his energy into the creating of a . . . General
Staff.

. . .

^he War Minister, H.O. Arnold-For ster did

22Xbid., p. 136.
pp. 141-1^3•

cf. Repington, Imperial Strategy,

I b i d .. pp. 137-166.
cf. H i t t l e , p. 135.
This
short sketch of the German staff is necessary as it provides
the roots from which the British staff grew.
2 lf
I b i d . , p. 133* cf. Repington, Imperial Strategy,
P. 1**7.
25
Brett (ed.), Vol. II, p # 33*
Again Esher exhibited
his perspicacity in matters of army reform.
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not see fit to pay heed to this advice until almost his final
hour in the War Office.

It is true that under his regime and

as a result of findings of the Esher Committee,

a Chief of

the General Staff had replaced the office of Commander-in
Chief.However,

as of yet the head did not have a body.

On 11 November 1903» Arnold-Forster published a memorandum
which was addressed to the Chief of the General Staff.

The

memorandum laid a framework for the establishment of a British
General Staff.^7
The major provisions of Arnold-Forster*s recommen
dations were as follows]

General Staff officers were to be

selected on the basis of their personal qualifications.
a small number of officers should be initially selected.

Only
A

General Staff appointment was to be for four years and at the
end of this period, the officer would be considered, for reten
tion on the General Staff list.

Accelerated promotion would

be the reward for distinguished General Staff service.
Arnold-Forster further outlined a list of duties for
General Staff officers.

He insisted that the General Staff

would, not be constituted as a separate corps as was the
Prussian staff design;

it was desired that officers selected

for the General Staff were graduates of the Staff College, but
2 ^S u p r a ., p. 23*
^ H . O . Arnold-Forster, Military Needs and Military
Policy (London:
Smith, Elder and C o •, 1909)V PP* 193-207,
hereafter cited as “Military N e e d s . “ cf. Repington, Imperial
St rategy, pp. 135-160.

this was not a mandatory requirement.

Initially,

an

individual*s Army rank in relation to length of service would
not affect appointment to the staff.

General Staff promotions

were to be controlled by the Chief of the General Staff and
the officers of the General Staff would be directly respon
sible to h i m . ^
With this memorandum Arnold-Forster provided a basic
foundation for a General Staff system in Britain.

Whether or

not Arnold-Forster could have translated his theories into
policy must remain conjecture as he was destined to leave
office within a month*s time.^9
Lord Hartington,

Spenser Wilkinson, Viscount Esher,

and Colonel Repington had brought the need for a General Staff
to the attention of the English government and the English
people*

The oft maligned Arnold-Forster had outlined a

framework upon which the staff could, be built,
of completion,

yet the task

and, of implementation fell to his successor,

Haldane.30
Viscount Esher,

as was typical of him, wasted little

time in maiding his views on General Staff organization known
to the new War Minister.

Only eight days after Haldane had

taken office, Lord Esher wrote a detailed, letter in which he
^^I b i d . Arnold-Forster*s reprint of his memorandum
supplemented by Repington*s interpretation provides an
excellent source for the 1905 General Staff Memorandum.
29
30

Supra, p. 31.

Gordon, p. 98 .
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presented his views and concepts for a British Staff
Esher was not as impressed with the German system as some of
his contemporaries*

He wrote,

"No foreign system is applic-

able to the insular peculiarities of our Army*

• • .'*32

General Staff must have sufficient flexibility to provide for
expansion in time of war*

He further recommended that quali-

fied officers should be placed on a General Staff list even
though some of them were being utilized in other duties*

He

advised Haldane to select General Staff officers on a pro
bationary term for one year, at the end of which time their
appointments could be confirmed by the Chief of the General
Staff, and that those officers who had not attended a Staff
College be sent to the school after they were placed on the
General Staff l i s t . ^ \
The military voice of the T i m e s * Colonel Repington,
also let it be known that he favored "* • • the spirit and
not the letter of the German General Staff*
Haldane,

* * *

knowing that Campbell-Bannerman had pre

viously opposed the General Staff idea,

shrewdly laid the

groundwork for his plans in his speech to the House of
Commons on 8 March 1906*
3xBrett

He discussed the problems of the

<ed.), Vol. XI, pp. 129-130.

32Ibid.
33xbid.
^"Charles a Court Repington, Vestigia, Reminiscences ‘
of Peace and War (Bostons
Houghton Mifflin Co *, 1909)»
P* 2J>9* hereafter cited "Vestigia.M
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South African War and. then continued:
Unlike the other great nations, we had never estab
lished any thinking department for the British
Army.
If there had been such a thinking department
it would have made out plans for the operations in
South Africa . . . Those -who have read the account of
.. the Japanese campaign will know the' profound advantage
of a thinking department embodied in the General Staff.
The late Government . . * laid the foundation of a
General Staff.
We have got to work it out. • •
Haldane relied heavily on the assistance of Colonel Ellison
and General Ewart, his Director of Military Operations,
formulation of the General Staff p l a n * ^
final conclusions, however,

in the

Before reaching any

the War Minister felt that he

would like to see the German Army firsthand.

He "managed"

an invitation from the German Emperor for himself and Ellison
and on August 29# 1906,

arrived, in Germany.37

Mr. Haldane and

Colonel Ellison were impressed by what they saw, particularly,
the efficient functioning of the German S t af f.

The neatly

3
compartmented support functions were particularly impressive.'
However, the principle which had the most profound influence
on Haldane and was clearly reflected in his later creation
of the General Staff, was a clear division of the functions
-^Haldane,

Army R e f o r m , p. 23*

“^Hal da ne ,

An Autobiography, pp. 21U-215.

^ Ibid., cf. Sommer, p. 179*

^Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 220-221.
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of command, training,

and war operations from that of admin

istration. 39
The Secretary of State for War continued his practice
of drawing from the experts.
Wilkinson,

He consulted with Spenser

a recognized “staff11 a u t h o r i t y ^

and, the ever

present Esher also continued inundating Haldane with his
advice.

Lord Esher contended, that it was of major importance

that the General Staff undergo a thorough and continual
training program.

This staff must be “ . • • trained specially

to deal with large questions of preparation for war.

• • •

On 12 September 1906, Haldane established the General
Staff through means of an Army Order and a memorandum which
lip
he had personally written. ^ In this staff memorandum,
Mr. Haldane made it clear that a General Staff would not
appear overnight but that it would, take time to train and
establish such an instrument.
General Staff,

He further stated that the

as an organization, must remain flexible and

-^Grey, et al. , Viscount H a l d a n e , p. 10.
Arnold-Forster
later attempted, to establish the fact that Haldane* s visit to
Germany had no influence on the formation of the British Staff.
He claimed that Haldane prepared the General Staff Order prior
to his trip and, made no further changes before it was pub
lished in September 1906.
Arnold-Forster, Military N e e d s ,
pp. 192-193*
Mr-Haldane claimed the contrary.
Infra., P* 8 7 .
A detailed examination of the General Staff Order, however,
weights the argument in H a l d a n e ’s favor and suggests
Mr. Arnold-Forster might have been suffering from "sour grapes."
^ S p e n s e r Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, 187^-1909
(Londons
Constable and Co., L t d . , 1933)> pp. 305-306.
^Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, p. 166.

^2Sommer, p. 173*
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that changes may need, to be made as the requirements of
England and the Army c h a n g e . ^
wrote,

“The General Staff,11 Haldane

“will be judged by the men it produces.

The

memorandum further contained a hint of future plans.
r>. • • There is no reason,11 stated Haldane,

“why its /the

General Staff %sj influence should not extend ultimately far
beyond these shores and India.
The Army Order was very similar to Mr. Arnold-Forster*s
memorandum.

Thp General Staff was divided into two functionss

a General Staff at Army Headquarters and a General Staff ser
ving in commands and districts.

The Headquarters Staff

would function as a policy-making body concerning itself with
military training,

staff duties and military operations.

War

planning, collection of intelligence, as well as the prepara
tion of maps, codes and cyphers were also placed under the
k6
purview of this select group.
The General Staff serving in the field was charged
with advising the commanders and the staffs of the units they
were serving, particularly in matters of professional education
of officers and the training of troops.

The Field Staff was

**3The Times (London), September 13* 1906.
a clear reflection of the Esher influence.

This shows

^ I b i d . The Times carried a complete reprint of
Haldane *s Memorandum as well as the General Staff Order in
its 13 September issue.
^■5Ibid.
Ibid, cf.
A.R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the
Staff College (Londoni
Constable and Co.7 Ltd., 1927)7
pp. Z k ^ Z k k .
,
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also responsible for insuring that the policy prescribed by
Army Headquarters was carried out.^^
General. Staff* officers were to be selected from offi
cers who were u• • . considered most likely to prove capable
of forming a school of progressive military thought*
These officers would be placed on an unpublished General
Staff list and. posted to the staff as vacancies occurred.
Appointments were to be for four years.

At the end of that

time an officer below the substantive rank of LieutenantColonel would, be returned to his regiment for a one year
period.

The

and officers

first year of staff service

was to be probationary

below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, who were

not Staff College graduates, would be sent to the Staff College
after the completion of the four years of General Staff service*
Officers who

distingui shed, themselves on the Staff would be

identified for accelerated, promotion and

brevetted. up to and.

49
including the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

Appendix A to the General Staff Order contained a
detailed, list of Staff duties,

covering the areas of military

training, military education and military o p e r a t i o n s . ^
^The
48

Times (London),

September 13* 1906.

Ibid.*

^9 Ibid.
■ ^ I b i d . The General Staff Order, after close inspection, reveals a considerable German influence particularly
in the dichotomy of staff organization*
The framework of
Arnold-Forster, the suggestions of Viscount Esher as well as
the concepts enunciated by Spenser Wilkinson and General
Bronsart von Schellendorf (Per Dienst des Generalstabes),
are clearly in evidence*
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Initially,

the General Staff at Army Headquarters was

provided with an authorization of fifty-seven officers
including three Major-Generals,

six Colonels,

twenty-one

Lieutenant— Colonels and Majors and. twenty— seven Staff
Captains.

The portion of the Staff which was to be posted

in the commands and districts was authorized one Major-General,
six Brigadier-Generals,

sixteen Colonels, fifty-four Lieutenant-

Colonels and Majors, twelve Staff Captains and twenty-five
Brigade Majors,

a total of 114 officers.

This table of

authorization provided an aggregate of 171 officers* billets
on the British General S t af f . ^
Reactions to the General Staff Order were mixed*
Colonel Repington hailed the British General Staff as a
". • • graft upon the rebel British stem, the greatest product
of the schools of Berthier and of Moltke.
Forster raised great "hue and cry."

• • •

Arnold-

He proclaimed that the

General Staff had been his creation and that he had been
deprived of the honor and the credit to which he was
entitled, ^

an argument he continued to pursue in a number of

books which he wrote in the years that followed.
The majority of the Army welcomed its new "brain."
However,

there were some senior regimental officers who resented
•51 ibid.
52
^ Repington, V e s t i g i a , p. 2j?9o
■-^Arnold-Forster, Military N e e d s , pp. 193-208.
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Headquarters interference -with their commands.

This group

was in the minority and the General Staff soon became a
respected institution and junior and senior officers alike
<h.
competed freely for the choice posts.
The War Minister openly admitted the General Staff
h ad not been an original idea with him.

In a speech on 15

September at Newcastle-on-Tyne, Mr* Haldane stamped the Staff
idea "Made in Germany*"
mission,

He credited the Hartington Com

the Esher Committee,

and his predecessor, Mr* Arnold-

Forster, with their contributions*

The Army Council also came

in for a share of the plaudits for the creation of this staff*
Further, Mr* Haldane pointed out that there were "• * * many
things, that would not have been there unless we had had
repeated and frequent conversations with the German General
S t a f f . m56
There is no doubt that many must share the credit
for the creation of a British General Staff, yet it was
Haldane who took an idea which had been smoldering in the War
Office for sixteen years,

and brought it to f ruition. ^

Nor

was the War Minister content with this accomplishment as he
clearly foresaw the need to expand the "Thinking Department"
of the British Army to encompass the military forces of the
•^Godwin-Austen, pp. z b 5~ 2 U 6 o
^ The Times

(London), September 15* 1906.

^Ibid.
•^Repington, V e s t i g i a , pp* 259-260.
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entire Empire.
The Imperial General Staff is Created
As the Secretary of State for War became more and.
more deeply engrossed, in the military affairs of the British
Empire, it became obvious to him that the dominions were
destined to play a greater role in the defense of the
Empire. ^

In order to incorporate dominion forces into the

defense scheme,

it was necessary to provide for uniform

training methods,

standard, organization,

military education for the officers.

and professional

Haldane set Generals

Nicholson and Haig to the task of working out proposals to
achieve these aims.^9
In 1907,
in London.

an Imperial Conference of Premiers was held

It was at this meeting that Haldane presented a

resolution asking for military cooperation and requesting
that priority should be given to the establishment of an
Imperial General Staff.

Haldane addressed the colonial

delegates and pointed out the need for common organization,
standardized training methods,

and. explained, the benefits

that could be derived, by all the member nations if an
Imperial General Staff were instituted•^

He let it be known

[fO

Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in
Imperial Defense (Baltimore!
The Johns Hopkins Press,
1965), p. 2 7 2 . cf. Dunlop, pp. 293-296.
^Terraine,

p. ^f-3*

6o D.C. Gordon, pp. 272-273.

89
that the functions of command and administration were to be
retained by the dominion government concerned*

The General

Staff would function as an advisory agency at the request of
the respective government and would concern itself primarily
with planning,
ces.

61

organization,

and training of the Empire for-

The conferees accepted and approved the proposals

of the Secretary of State for War and requested that a
memorandum be prepared for their consideration which outlined
in detail the workings of an Imperial General Staff*
General Sir W.G* Nicholson,

Chief of the British

General Staff, immediately began to prepare this memorandum
and submitted it on 17 December 1908*

This document stressed

uniformity and standardization of strategic concepts and
training*

General Nicholson went even further and established

the requirement that all officers identified for service with
the Imperial General Staff would have to be graduates of the
Staff College*

The Staff College at Camberley was designated

as the primary military professional school of the Empire* *
Nicholson

further proposed an interchange of officers

and frequent communication between Chiefs of the Dominion
^ I bid*

cf*

Teagarden, p* 126*

62Hittle, pp* 13ih-135;

D*C* Gordon, p* 27^; Teagarden,

p* 1 2 7 *
^ H i t t l e , p. 133; D. C. Gordon, p. 2 73 . The Prussian
approach of developing the staff as a military intellectM is
reflected in N i c h o l s o n 1s proposals*
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/TI,
Staffs and the Imperial General Staff in London.
This memorandum was presented by Haldane before the
Imperial Defense Conference which met in London in July of
1909-

The Dominion representatives accepted. Haldane*s pro

posals wholeheartedly and thus joined in a partnership for
defense with the Mother Country.

In November of 1909> the

title of Chief of the General Staff was changed to the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff and General Sir William
Nicholson became the first incumbent of that off ic e.^5
The establishment of the Imperial Staff won wide-spread
approval.

Repington,

even though he was not entirely pleased

with the work of the staff in the field, voiced his wholehearted
approval.00

General Haig indicated that the creation of the

Imperial General Staff H . • . puts 50fo onto the value of the
General S t a ff .u^7
In the remaining years proceeding World War I, the fruits
of coordinated, staff planning on an Imperial scale were soon
realized.

The Imperial General Staff was a logical outgrowth

from the British General Staff, but the laurels for its creation
belong to Haldane and those who labored with him.
^Dunlop,

p. 297*

^•5I b i d », p. 2 9 8 .
Thought,

Haldane,

An Au tobiography, pp. 213-21L.

J a y
Luvaas, The Education of an Army, British Military
1815-19^0 (London:
Cassell, 1 9 6 5 ), p. 312.

^Terrains, p. LU.

. CHAPTER V
THE SECOND LINE
The Origins of the Second Line
One of the most difficult problems that confronted.
the Secretary of State for War in his mission of army reform
“
w as the revamping of the Auxiliary Forces.

The responsibilities

of the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers were not clearly
defined and they existed under a ,rhodgepodge 11 of legal and
political restrictions which made them a costly luxury.**"

Ihese

semi-trained military establishments riddled with tradition,
prejudices,

and. special interest groups did not fit the

Haldane formula of economy and. efficiency. 2
It was in the smoke-filled library at Cloan in the
first months of the War M i n i s t e r fs term of office where the
idea for a Territorial Army was spawned, by the fertile minds
of Haldane and Ellison.

They clearly foresaw the necessity

of an organized,

defined force, a Second Line to back the
3
Expeditionary F o r c e / a military force which could be expanded
into a larger array if required.

Grey,

^Maurice, Vol. I, pp. 20L-20.5; Lee, Vol. II, p. L9^+;
et a l ., Viscount H a l d a n e , pp. 8-9*
^Haldane,

An Autobiography, p. 199*

^Dunlop, p. 366; Teagarden, pp. lL8-1^9*
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The Volunteers had only limited equipment;
Militia did not fit any pattern of organization;

the

and the

Yeomanry was a tradition ridden,

semi-trained, mounted corps

officered by country gentlemen.

It was Haldane*s aim to take

these diverse forces,

transgress the boundaries of tradition

and. politics and mold them into a usable fighting force.**'
In January of 1906 , Haldane dispatched his first
memorandum to the Army Council which outlined his basic
scheme for a Territorial Army built from the Militia,
Volunteers and Yeomanry.*'*

This force was to be administered

by county associations similar to those which Cromwell had
used.^

Unlike his predecessors, Haldane proceeded slowly.

He formed, a committee in May of 1906 which Lord Esher chaired.
The Territorial Force; Committee was composed of forty-five
prominent Regular Army, Militia,

and. Volunteer officers.

The

purpose of "The Duma," as it was nicknamed, was to determine
if the Auxiliary Forces could, be established by agreement in
preference to legislation.^

Among the more prominent members

of this committee were Lord Roberts and Lord Methuen, both
Regular Army officers, Lord Lovat,

the Duke of Bedford,

and

Colonel J.E.B. Seely, who was destined to become H a l d a n e 1s

8

successor•

**Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 205-206 .
-*Brett (ed. ), Vol. II, pp. 205-206.
^Dunlop, p. 2 6 6 .
^I b i d ., Maurice, Vol. I, p. 206.
Russian attempt at a parliamentary body.

^Ibid., Dunlop, pp. 267-268.

The "Duma" was a
•.

9b

The committee did not reach a decision,
publish a formal report.
entirely wasted.

nor did it

Their efforts, however, were not

They worked, out a detailed plan for

utilizing the county associations to perform the adminis
trative functions for a Territorial Force.

They decided that

the Territorial Army would be composed of Yeomanry, Volun
teers and, Cadet Corps.
being,

The aloof Militia were,

excluded as they did not come to terms.9

for the time
It soon

became evident to Haldane that he would not be able to
establish the Territorial Army by agreement;
would be necessary.

legislation

10

ICing Edward VII was a stout proponent of the Terri
torial scheme. ll

However, when Haldane neglected to inform

the sovereign as to whom he h a d placed on this committee he
received a stern rebuke.

Haldane did not risk the K i n g 1s

friendship and support in this matter again
It was no easy task to unravel the complex ties of
political influence and tradition which bound the Auxiliary
establishment;

the roots were too deeply entwined with the

history of Britain.

^Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, pp. 167- 1 6 9 .

**^Dunlop, p. 2 6 9 *
ilLee, Vol. II, p. ^95•^Ibid., p. 5 0 0 *
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The Militia
The Militia,

the "Old Constitutional Force," was

formed for home defense in the sixteenth century.

It fought

with distinction during the French invasion of 1690 and later
was called upon "• • • to deal with the Jacobite
rising.

• • .

In the early l800*s the Militia was granted

a semi-Regular status and in l8**8 , was again revived as a
Volunteer force.

The "Constitutional Force" was not liable

for service abroad, however, many of its officers and men
volunteered for service during the Peninsular War and in
Crimea.

During the Boer War, the Militia furnished

. . more than **5,000 officers and men.

. . . "1 ^

The M i l i t i a 1s role had continually been one of reenforcement for the Regular contingents.
of it,

Lord Lansdowne said

". • . It was plundered at one end by the Line and

encroached upon at the other by the V o l un t ee rs •
this proud force numbered 98,000 men,

By 1906,

approximately **0,000

•j zT

less than authorized.

{

The Yeomanry
The Yeomanry traced its origin t o '1761, but it was
■^Gordon, p. 8 6 .
1^ I b i d ., p. 8 7 .
■*^Grey, et a l . , Viscount H a l d a n e , p. 8 , cf. Haldane,
An Autobiography, p. 205•
^Gordon,

p# 87*
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not utilized until the French Revolutionary W a r s . ^
were a form of volunteer cavalry,

They

largely drawn from rural

and agricultural areas and officered, by the landed gentry.

i ft

The law provided that the Yeomanry could be called up in the
event of "imminent national danger and great emergency.
As a result,

the Imperial Yoomanry furnished over 27,000 men

during the Boer War and were used, with success as mounted
infan tr y•
The Volunteers
The Volunteers were of more recent vintage.

In 1802, .

when a Napoleonic invasion threatened, England responded with
a Volunteer Force of **0,000 men, however,
this force rapidly deteriorated•^

as danger lessened,

In 1859* when danger

again threatened England, patriots formed, all over the country.
They drilled, and organized themselves;
primarily by their commanding officers.

the expense was borne
This force continued

in being and, over 20,000 men served in the South African War.^^
1 7e •K.G. Six smith, "Reserve and. Auxiliary Forces:
Some
Former Controversies," A r m y ■Quarterly, (April 1 9 6 6 ), pp. 1-2.
This article was furnished, by the author in proof form and
was scheduled for publication in April 1 9 6 6 . Therefore, page
references may not coincide with the actual publication copy.
*^Ibid. , W.H* Goodenough and J.C. Dalton, The Army
Book for the British Empire (London:
Her Majesty*s Stationery
O f f i c e , 1^937, pp. 37*4-376.
Six smith, p. 2.
Grey, et a l . , Viscount H a l d a n e , p. 9*

23-Gordon, pp. 88-89*
^ I b i d ., cf. Goodenough and Dalton, pp. 379-381.
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The Volunteer Force, due to its nature, was composed mostly
of infantry with a sprinkling of artillery and engineers and
was confined to the battalion l e v e l . T h e

government pro

vided. arms and ammunition and. a capitation grant of thirtyeight shillings per man.

This was hardly sufficient and a

large financial burden was placed on the commanding officers
of these Volunteer units.

The task of amalgamating these

units, each with its own proud, history, would most likely have
discouraged a lesser man than Haldane, who continued to

'

tenaciously pursue his goal.
The Militia Stands Firm
Xt was clearly the Militia who presented the most dif
ficult problem and a conference was called at the War Office
to treat with the representatives of this stubborn and
parochial f o r c e M a j o r - G e n e r a l Mackinnon arranged the con
ference with fourteen Militia Colonels, headed by the JDuke of
Bedford and Lord Raglan.

Lord Roberts, Lord Methuen, and

General Mackinnon, as well as Generals Stopford, Haig and
Colonel Ellison, represented the War Office, and the dependable
Esher consented to chair the meeting. °

^Go r d o n , p. 89 .
2^Sixsmith, p. 2.
2^Dunlop, pp. 269-270.
26Xbid.
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The War Office made the following proposals:
The Militia should not form part of the Territorial
Army; that the Militia should be drawn closer to
the Regular Troops; that it should be made liable
to service abroad in case of emergency; and that in
the event of its being sent abroad, it was desirable
that it should go out, as far as possible, in com
plete battalions or companies under their own of
ficers, but that this should, not preclude its being
utilized, to furnish drafts to the Regular Army in
the field when necessary.2 ?
The War Office proposal was rejected by the Militia
Colonels who countered with a proposal of their own.

The

Militia stipulated that its officers should rank equal with
officers of the line battalions;

that they should be granted

an exemption from civil obligation; money for uniforms should
be given the Militia; bounty payments should be modified;

and,

no one who had. previously served two terms in the Militia
should be allowed, to compete for a Commission in the Regular
Army.

The Militia further demanded that it should be ac

corded all honors of the line battalions to which they were
attached.

These demands were unacceptable to the War Office

representatives.

pp

The War Minister made one more attempt to reach an
agreement with the Militia.

He met informally with. Lord

Derby and offered, a final choice.

The Militia could, either

take a leading place in the Territorial Army or ally them
selves more closely with the Regular Forces.
2 ?Ibid., p. 270.
15^1— 155,

cf•

The Militia

Sixsmith, p. 6.

2^Dunlop, p. 270;
Sixsmith, p. 6; Teagarden, pp.
citing Command Paper 3 5 1 3 ? p* 3*
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chose to do neither,
On the other

and their fate was sealed.2^
hand, the Volunteer officers did

not

relish turning over their commands to county associations
and many of them looked upon their units with great pro
prietary interest.

It was H a l d a n e fs viewpoint that the Vol

unteers would make a

much more efficient addition to the

Territorial Force if

the commanding officers were not plagued

with financial responsibilities which had been their lot.

30

Viscount Esher strongly supported the War Minister in a letter
to the King,s secretary.

He wrote,

you say about the Volunteers.

"i agree with every wo£d.

They are a gigantic fraud.

• • • I am strongly in favour of Haldane*s
scheme.

*County Associations1

• • ."31
It was now October and. the pressure of influential

Volunteer officers caused Haldane to waver
ment to county associations.

on his commit

A staunch supporter of the

county association idea, Lord. Esher prodded, the War Minister,
You have got to choose between a certain amount of
opposition in the H^ousje7 of C ^ o m m o n a n d a loss
of personal prestige in~the Country.
To my mind,
the position is not doubtful.
You can, with
your large majority, risk the former.
You can
not risk the latter.32

^Dunlop,

p. 272.

-^Teagarden, p. 157* citing Ellison, Lancashire L a d ,
XVII (February 1936), p. 9.
^Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, p. 1 8 5 .

32Ibid.., p. 195.
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The decision made, Haldane enlisted the aid of an
old friend, John Kemp, and some of his old "devils1* at
Lincoln's Inn in drawing up the preliminary Territorial
Force bill^3 and then asked Frederick Liddell to couch the
bill in the proper Parliamentary format.
The opposition was by no means cowed*

The controver

sial General Wilson, who believed in armies of large Contin
ental formations, belittled the Territorial Force*

Lord

Roberts added, his doubts and Arnold-Forster was free with his
r

vitriolic comments*35

Major General Haig rode to the support

of the embattled War Minister and firmly defended the Terri
torial plan*

**I deprecate any change in the policy of creating

a second line Army, complete in all arras and service
Committed to legislation, the War Minister, like a
careful artisan, began to lay his plan for Parliamentary
victory*

Through Esher he enlisted the support of the King*

Esher observed to the King,
There is no doubt that very serious troubles lie in
the immediate future for Mr* Haldane, owing to the
opposition which his scheme will rouse in the
Volunteers, and great strength of character will
be required to push the scheme through the House
of Commons where the Volunteers command large in
terest *37

33Haldane, An Autobiography, p* 206* ."Devils" here
refers to some of Haldane *s former lawyer assis ta nt s* •
3*Ibld.
33punlop, p. 2?5; Terrains, p* Jf2*
36Ibid.
37B rott (®d.), Vol. II, p. 205.
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On 20 December, Haldane presented bis plan to the
cabinet and received, their support.

Esher records,

the Prime

M in i s t e r 11• • • told. Haldane that he might count on his
thorough support.
understand,

The fact is that none of the cabinet

or ever -will understand,

the question.,f*^

Realizing the importance of keeping the monarch i n 
formed, on 12 January 1 9 0 7i the War Minister sent the King a
draft of his bill.

The King pledged his full support.^9

Leaving little to chance, Haldane arranged to meet with Balfour,
the Opposition leader,
requested his support.
chance.^

on a weekend at Windsor Castle and
Balfour agreed, to give Haldane his

The problem now remained to squeeze the bill into

the busy legislative calendar.

One of the Liberal social

reform bills had. run into difficulties and Haldane explained,
HI had a little Bill which, would just fill the t i m e . " ^
Preparations made, the wiley War Minister was now ready

to

guide his bill through Parliament.
The Territorial and. Reserve Forces Act
The Secretary of State for War chose bis second esti
mate speech which he delivered on 25 February 1907, as a
•^X b i d . , p. 209* Viscount Esher, as well as Haldane,
was surprised by Campbell-Bannerman1s support which may
account for Esher*s facetious comment.
^ L e e , Vol. IX, p. 500.
King Edward was vitally
interested in the passage of the Territorial Bill and gave
the matter his personal attention.
IxQ
Haldane,
^Ibid.

An Autobiography, p. 207*
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handy vehicle to outline his plan for the Territorial and
Reserve Forces''Bill*^

Haldane realized that he •would, need

the full support of the Liberal benches for his Army Bill.
Ke began his speech by unveiling a budget reduction of
£,2 ,0 3 6 *0 0 0 , an accomplishment for which he gave full credit
to the A r m y . ^
Militia.

He then fired, his opening volley at the

He pointed outs

We get 12,000 recruits a year for the infantry of the
Line from the Militia at present, and without the
Militia we could not get them. . . . The result is
that under the existing system the War Office must
control the Militia. . . . and if the Militia p r o - ^
tests against it, . . . the Militia must go under.
The Yeomanry did not present major problems and only
a minor effort would be required to establish them as the
cavalry of the Territorial A r m y . ^
The third element of the Territorial Army would be fash
ioned from the Volunteers.

Haldane portrayed the sadly lacking

financial structure of this force,
were at war,
socks,

-'if they ^the Volunteerjs/

the Colonel, whose business it is to provide

clothes,

ammunition,

and. everything else, would have
J,/T
to carry these things with him in his saddle-bags."
Haldane
proposed, a standard financial arrangement for the Territorial
Army which would allow the Volunteer commanders to spend their
■^Dunlop, p. 277; Maurice, Vol. X, p. 209*
^ S o m m e r , p. 191*
Haldane, Army R e f o r m , pp. 9^-99*
This speech may also be found in ParTI Debs., 4, CLXIX (1907’)*
pp. 1290- 1 3 2 6 .
^Haldane,

Army R e f o r m , p. 108.

^ Xbid. , p. 1 1 0 .

^6Ibid., p. 111.
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time training their units instead of worrying about financing
them.
The Territorial Army was to be organized in fourteen
divisions supported by fourteen mounted brigades,
with their own supply and support organizations,
artillery and. engineers.

complete
as well as

The force would be organized on a

county basis and the administration would be vested, in the
Lord Lieutenants of the c o u n t y . ^

The primary purpose of the

Territorial Army would, be home service and the men would
undergo an intensive

six month training course.

There was,

hn
however, no restriction on Territorial Force service abroad. ^
Haldane concluded his address by detailing the ad
vantage of the Territorial Force.

Primarily the British nation

would, now have both a first and second line available for
mobilization.

The second, line would be expandable in the

event of war.

In this manner,

an efficient force would be

provided, at home to lorotect the country from the danger of
invasion or raids.
The War Minister then informed the members of the
House that a copy of his bill would be available on the
following Monday and to provide sufficient time for study the
bill would not be placed, on the legislative calendar until

J,o
Maurice, Vol. I, p. 209; Haldane,
p p . 115-119*
^Dunlop,
pp. 1300-1306.

p. 278, Pari. Debs..,fr,

■^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 1 5 0 .

Army R e f o r m ,

.CLXIX (1907)*

after Easter.*^
The same day Mr. Haldane Issued his Memorandum upon
the Military Forces in the United, Kingdom. I n

this docu

ment Haldane explained his plan in detail and enumerated, the
weaknesses of the Auxiliary Forces as they presently existed.
Debato oontinuod in the House of Commons for three days.
The powers, duties and tasks of the county associations were
fully discussed as were the roles of the Territorial Force
53
and the special reserve,'
The bill was introduced on 4 March 1907, and the
second reading was taken on April 9* 10 » and 23*

5b

out the fight, Haldane*s optimism never faltered,

Through
even though

there were others who thought that the opposition of the
•
55
Yeomanry and. Volunteers would threaten the bill's passage.
The debate continued and the speakers rambled on.

The

opposition was not able to mount a concerted attack;

they were

satisfied with attacking first one point and then another.
The influence of Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry,

each

battling for their own parochial interest, was soon dissipated.
The bill ha d its third reading on June 19•
Forster rose to attack the Territorial scheme.

Arnold-

In his

^ 1I bi d., pp. 153-15**.
Dunlop, p. 2 7 9 9 citing Command. Paper 3297 of 190 7 *
^ Ibid. , p. 280.
^ I b i d ., p. 281; Maurice, Vol. I, p. 211.

^Brett

(ed.), Vol. II, pp. 227-228.
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harangue he constantly referred back to his own dead plan
for a short term Army.

The War Minister quickly disposed of

A rnold-Forster1s pathetic arguments.

He quipped,

**I own that

X -was under the impression that X found, a deceased, baby,
X decently interred it.**-^

and

The bill* passed, by a majority

of 286 to 6 3 *^
The Earl of Portsmouth, Under-Secretary of State for
War, guided Haldane*s bill on its journey through the House
of Lords.5$

The question of the Militia -was uppermost in the

minds of the Lords.
the problem,

The Earl of Verayss accurately summed up

**Your Lordships are no doubt aware that • • •

the Militia has been taken out of the Territorial Force,
is no longer grouped with the Volunteers and Yeomanry.

and

. . .

The Militia is now to be a reserve for the A r m y . M^^
!

Xn order to placate the opposition in the Lords, Haldane,

with Esher*s help,

compromised, on a few minor points of his

plan and in the middle of July the bill was finally accepted.
The King 1s formal consent was received on 2 August. 61
•-^Dunlop, p. 2 8 3 *
^Tparl. D e b s ., b, CLXXVI (1907), pp. 578-579.
^Maurice,

Vol. X, p. 212.

^ D u n l o p , p # 28b;
6oBrett

Sommer, p. 19**.

(ed. ), Vol. XI, p. 239.

6lLee, Vol. II, p. 501;

Dunlop, p. 2 8 5 .

60
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The bill was a concise document,
parts*

divided into four

Part I dealt with the county associations,

their

powers and duties, financial arrangements and regulations.
Part II delineated, the rules and regulations which would, govern
the Territorial Force,
discipline, pay,

and covered, such items as recruitment,

enlistment terms,

and, terms of service.
liabilities of service,

training,

civil rights,

Part III concerned the Reserve Force,
enlistment and also dealt with transfer

of Militia battalions to reserve units.
a short miscellaneous section.

Part IV constituted

62

The passage of the Territorial Army bill caused con
siderable stir since its provisions affected not only mem
bers of the military establishment, but reached out to every
corner of civilian enterprise where officers of the Auxiliary
elements were engaged.
H.O. Arnold-Forster continued to indiscriminately
attack every part of the b i l l . ^

Spenser Wilkinson depre

cated, the War M i n i s t e r fs accomplishments and wrote that all
Haldane 11. . . had. done was to rechristen the Volunteers.
In an article published by the Contemporary R e v i e w , F.N. Maude
^ G r e a t Britain, Statutes at L a r g e , 7 Edw. VII, Ch. 9
(190 7 )9 "Territorial and, Reserve Forces Act, 1907*" PP* 1-26.
^ T h e Times (London), March 5 , 1 9 0 7 . Mr. ArnoldForster carried out his attack in a series of articles
published, in The Times on March 5* 8 , 10 and 16.
^ W i lkinson, Thirty-Five Y e a r s , p. 308.
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criticized the financial arrangements of the new Territorial
Army.^-5

The Quarterly R e v i e w , on the other hand,, felt that

the training provisions were insufficient to fit the Terri
torial Army for service in the event of an e m e r g e n c y . ^

Other

journals of the day decried the untimely demise of the proud,
Mili tia.
The Territorial Army also had an equal number of
staunch supporters.

The influential Colonel Repington was

generous with Jiis praise for the War Minister.

"Mr. Haldane

and his military advisors have done their duty by the country
and have done it well,

considering the notorious limitations

which restrict their initiative.
tribute of the Prime Minister,
he wrote to his War Minister,

Most surprising was the

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman;
"it is a great triumph to have

carried, such a large body of opinion with you,

and X hope you

will have as much satisfaction when you proceed to carry out
,

and

superintend the details of your magnum o p u s ."

The

Territorial Army Becomes a Reality

/ ' O

The task was, however, only half finished.

It now

^ F . N . Maude, "The New Army Scheme," The Contemporary
Review, XCI (January-June 1907), P* 519*
rtr

"Mr. Haldane and, The Army," Quarterly Review
(January-April 1907), p. ^73.
^ C h a r l e s a Court Repington, The Foundations of
Reform (London:
Simpkin, Marshall and, Co., 1908), p. 32^.

^Haldane, An Autobiography, p. 195*
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remained to man the Second Line by voluntary enlistment*
Haldane traversed the country lecturing,

explaining and

cajoling in an effort to win the support of county author
ities and Volunteer commanding officers.

The King supported

Haldane to the full extent of his royal power and did. what
no other man in England could have done for the Territorial
Army.

On 26 October he called a meeting of the Lord Lieu

tenants of England, Wales and. Scotland and enjoined them to
6q
give their full support to the Territorial Army. ^

.
■

My Lords and. Gentlemen, I have summoned you . . . to
acquaint you with the new duties and responsibilities
which will now devolve upon you. . . . Henceforth my
Yeomanry and my Volunteers are to form the Territorial
Army, over the destinies which you and your County
Associations are to watch; so to you are now delegated
the duties of raising, equipping and maintaining that
portion of this force the Imperial Army of the Second
Line which lies within the shores of this Kingdom.
The command and training of this force will be entrusted to the Generals in the commands and to the
generals and other officers serving them, so that
the force may enjoy in the fullest degree, in com
mon with the Regular Army, those advantages which
accrue from being instructed in the highest and most
developed school of military thought. . . . In the
performance of this difficult task I have instructed
the military authorities to render all the help that
is in their power to give; but the ultimate success
must depend upon the goodwill and public spirit of
my loyal subjects, inspired and guided by you and
your County Associations. • • • My Lords and Gentle
men, The important duties and responsibilities which
were formerly yours, are being restored, to you and
when you return hence to undertake this great and
honourable task, I look to you to foster and direct,
by your precept and example, the spirit of patriotic
and voluntary effort which has for so long distin
guished my loyal subjects. . . . I have faith that
the united efforts of my people will enable you to
achieve success.'
69Lee, Vol. II, p. .501.
^Maurice,

Vol. I, pp. 213-214

Thus spoke the King of England*
The JDuke of Norfolk,

on behalf of the Lord Lieu

tenants, assured his sovereign that they would perforin their
new duties*?^

Mr* Haldane was deeply grateful and expressed

his profuse thanks to the King*

Xn order to provide for a

period of conversion, Haldane fixed the birth date of the
Territorial Army as 1 April 1908*

72

The War Minister con

tinued to work tirelessly to stimulate enlistments in the
Territorial Army*

He traveled to all corners of England and

was never too busy to meet or visit with a new unit*

Slowly

73
the force g r e w . fy
Lord Esher persuaded The Daily Mail

(London) to con

duct a recruiting campaign on behalf of HThe Te rr i e r s .11

The

newspaper proved to be an appreciated ally in its efforts to
entice recruits for the Territorial Army*

74

B y 1 June 1909#

the Territorial Force numbered 9#313 officers and 259,463
men.^

Recruiting efforts continued and by 1910 the Terri

torial Army was manned to 88*5 per cent of its authorized
strength* ^
71Lee, Vol. XI, p. 501.
72Ibid.

Maurice, Vol. I, p. 214.

^ D u n l o p , p* 2 8 6 .
^**Brett (ed*), Vol. IX, p. 3^9*
“T er ri e r s 11 was a
popular nickname for the Territorial Army*
Haldane paid
special tribute to The Daily Mail for its aid in recruiting*
^Dunlop,

76jbid.

p. 287*
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The King also used, his great influence to increase
enlistments.

During the months of June and July 1909, the

sovereign presented 130 battalions with their colors,

and

in June he reviewed 108 Territorial Regiments and presented
colors to them at Windsor.77
Haldane*s vision of a Volunteer Army,
had. become reality.

a Second Line,

The creation of this force which was

designed to provide the backing for the Expeditionary Force
stands as a monument and. marked a major milestone of the
Haldane reforms.
Referring to the Second Line, Mr. Repington wrote,
"• • • The Minister deserves the gratitude of the country
for the patience,

assiduity,

and foresight which he has

displayed in promoting a national w o r k . 11^

The value of this

great accomplishment can best be measured by the tributes which
were paid, the Territorial Army on the occasion of its twentyfirst anniversary.

Lord Ypres remarked,

" • • • Without the

assistance which the Territorials afforded

• • . i t would have

been impossible to have h e l d the lines in France and B e l 
gium.

• • ,"79

was tfte King himself who added,

"There

was no theatre of war to which they did not penetrate;

there

was none in which they did not do credit to the British n a m e . 1' ^
77Lee, Vol. II, pp. 308- 5 0 9 .
^Repington,

Foundations of R e f o r m , p. 392.

P^Ihe Times (London), April 1, 1929*
formerly General Sir John French.

Lord Ypres

CHAPTER VI
IN RETROSPECT
The "Warrior 1s"Lot
The energy of Richard Burdon Haldane was like a
bubbling fountain.

In the remarkably short period of two

and a half years he completely revitalized and reorganized,
the British Army system.
a reality,

A trained Expeditionary Force was

the British General Staff was a functioning or

ganization and the Territorial Force was rapidly becoming
an effective combat reserve organization.

It was, however,

not yet the "warrior1s"lot to sheathe his sword for the task
was not yet complete.
f
Lord. Roberts and his National Service League believed
that the British Army should be a large force built on the
I
Continental model and advocated, national conscription.
Lord Roberts also had, the support of General Wilson,
Commandant of the Staff College, who was primarily concerned
about the lack of provision for expansion of the Army in war
time.

2

General Kitchener also lent his name to the cause of

the opposition.

He was typical of a small group of generals

•^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 221.
2 Callwell, Vol. I, p. 7 6 .

Ill

112
who believed that politicians were, by nature, incapable of
reforming the Army.^
On 12 March 1908, Roberts attacked Haldane*s scheme
in the House of Lords*

His target was the addition of

partially-trained artillery batteries to the Territorial
Force.

Artillery, Roberts contended,, must be fully trained,

and the Territorial batteries would, be useless even dangerLl
ous in their semi-trained state *
At this point even the King temporarily wavered in
his support of the War Minister and conveyed his doubts to
Haldane through a letter from Sir Arthur Davison who wrote 1
The King gathered from the views of Lord Roberts
and others that the training of the Territorial
artillery was inadequate, and drew your attention
to their argument that if these gunners were im
perfectly trained their value disappeared.5
Haldane, however, was able to allay his sovereign*s fears and
I
the dependable Esher rallied to the Xtfar Minister*s cause in
a letter to the King on 8 April 1908, which

closed with this

ringing indorsement,

done more for

11. • • Mr* Haldane has

Regular Army than any minister since Cardwell,

the

and that your

Majesty will be unfortunate when he ceases to be your Majes
ty* s Secretary of S t at e* 11^
In June 1908, the army estimates encountered fierce
1

^Philip Magnus, Kitchener:
Portrait of an Imperialist.
(New York:
E.P. Dutton and Company, I n c . , 1 9 5 9 )$ P« 228*
^Lee, Vol. II, p. 503? Maurice, Vol I, pp. 221-222;
D un lop^ p. 2 7 5 .
'
Wee,

Vol. II, p. 503*

6Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 302-303*
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opposition in the Cabinet.
Exchequer,
Trade,

Lloyd George, Chancellor of the

and Winston Churchill, President of the Board of

supported by Fisher, The First Sea Lord, advocated

drastic reductions in the army estimates.

Ihe pressure

became so intense that Haldane considered resignation.

How

ever, Edward VIX was so impressed with his War Minister*s
fight that he enjoined him to stand firm.

Haldane won the

battle of the estimates and fully regained the confidence of
the King.
Minister,

Haldane also had. the support of Asquith,

the Prime

and. Grey.?

The fight against conscription and the National Ser
vice League occupied much of the War Minister's time during
the years 1908 to 1910.
The powerful advocates of conscription
i
were firmly entrenched in the House of Commons and in the House
of Lords.

They were a "thorn in Haldane's side,11 particularly

while he was battling the retrenchers over the 1908 estimates.

8

The conscriptionists, meanwhile, moved to a liter
ary battlefield.

In 1909*

Spenser Wilkinson wrote Britain at

Bay which painted a dark future unless conscription became the
"order of the day."^

Arnold-Forster apparently could not

resist the challenge to reply.

In his book Military Needs

and Military Policy he resurrected the short service army

^Sommer, pp. 21L-217,
cf.
Philip Magnus, King Edward,
the Seventh (New York*
E.P. Dutton and. Company, I n c . , 1964),
pp. 386-387.
^Maurice, Yol. I., pp. 263- 2 6 6 .
^Spenser Wilkinson, Britain at Bay (London:
and Co., Ltd., 1910), P a s s i m .

Constable

I'll*
scheme he had advocated earlier.10
and asked his Adjutant-General,

Haldane entered, the fray

Sir Ian Hamilton,

the arguments against conscription.

to present

Haldane personally con

tributed a forty-two page "introduction" to H a m i l t o n 1s book
Compulsory Service:

A Study of the Question in the Light of

Experience.11
The National Service League refuted. Ha mi l to nfs book
with a pamphlet by its own champion, Lord Roberts,
Fallacies and Facts:

entitled

An Answer to "Compulsory Service.

This book was the last of the "literary lances."

lhere were

several attempts to push a compulsory service bill through
Parliament.

In each case, however, the bill ran into strong

opposition and was withdrawn.1^
Haldane continued to build the Territorial Force and
in 1 908, accomplished, yet another reform.

He published the

Army Order of 1 March 1908, whic h initiated an Officers*
Training Corps.

This program was designed to produce reserve

10Arnold,-Forster, Military N e e d s , p a s s i m .
U l a n Hamilton, Compulsory Service:
A Study of
the Question in the Light of Experience. (London:
John
Murray,' I9 I1 ), pp. 1-42.
Haldane's conduct here was
que st io na b le ,and he was criticized for involving an
active duty officer in a political conflict.
12

Earl Roberts, Fallacies and Facts, An answer to
"Compulsory Service."
(London: J o h n M u r r a y , 1911).

13farl. D e b s ., 4, CLXXXXI (1908), p. i486.
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officers with minimum interference to their civil careers
and formed officer training corps in conjunction with public
school and the university.

lL

The medical corps was improved and a nursing service
was added to the Territorial Force.

Throughout the remain

ing years of his career as War Minister, Haldane continued to
labor on behalf of the Royal Army.
The Later Years
He was raised to the peerage in 1911» and, in 1912,
when Lord Loreburn resigned the Lord Chancellorship, Asquith
offered the post to Haldane.

Haldane thanked the Prime

Minister in the following words,

"More than six years ago you

fought a hard, fight for your old friend over this great
\

office and now you have yourself bestowed it on him.
ing X will not try to express.

My feel

You know how deep it is. "1.5

In the years that followed, the ring of the German
jackboot became louder and louder and the British nation
girded, for war.

Old hatreds were revived and., as in time of

war and. national crisis, reason fled, the minds of men and
tempers flared.

Haldane's enemies w asted little time in

branding him a Germanophile.

It was said that in earlier

years Haldane had. made statements that his spiritual home was
l^Dunlop, pp. 29*4— 2 9 5 .
^ S o m m e r , p. 269*
Haldane's term as Lord Chancellor
is lucidly described in Haldane* An Autobiography, pp. 266-308.
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in Germany.

In truth,

this alluded, only to his love of

philosophy and. the roots of that discipline which are firmly
anchored in G e r m a n y . ^

No man was a greater patriot and had

more love of England than Haldane.

Ironically,

it was Lord

Haldane who was summoned, in the first days of the war to
put into action the plan which he h a d so faithfully designed.
Acting for the Prime Minister, Haldane returned to the War
Office and on 3 August 191** directed the immediate mobiliza
tion of the Expeditionary Force,, the Territorial Force and
other reserve elements.1 ?
After the end of the war in 1918, peace and tranquility
returned, once again to England.

Only then did Viscount Haldane

begin to receive some of the credit that was hi s due.

Yet,

one cannot help but consider the humiliating lies and. charges
which h a d been heaped upon this man who had devoted all of his
adult life to the law and.the service of England.

•^X b i d . , p. 302;

Sommer, pp. 318-319*

1 ?Hald.ane, An Autobiography, pp. 29^-300.
It should
be clarified that Haldane was not at this time Secretary of
State for War.
He acted temporarily for Asquith, the Prime
Minister, who h a d also assumed the War Minister's duties
following Sir John Seely's involvement in the "Curragh
M u t i n y .11

CHAPTER VXI
CONCLUSION
The Spirit of Haldane
Hie accomplishments of Viscount Haldane met the tests
of time and war.

The Expeditionary Force which was on British

soil in a matter of days after war was declared fought with
glory at Mons and Ypres.

The official British historian

lauded, the ft01d Contemptibles11 as f,The line that stood between the British Empire and ruin."

The Imperial General

Staff has lead the British
armed forces with honor and
\
efficiency through two world, wars and has only recently
!

i

reverted, to become once again the British General Staff.
The
t
Territorials, which in two wars were the nucleus around which
a great citizen army was formed, have lived until the present
day and only now are undergoing a complete revision to mold.
19
them to modern British defense requirements. ^
General Douglas Haig, when he returned, from the
shores of France at the end. of World, War I, visited Haldane
and presented, him with a copy of his war dispatches inscribed,
ftTo Viscount Haldane of Cloan —
^Terrains,

the greatest Secretary for

p. 112.

"^Letter from General Sir James Cassels, Chief of
Defence Staff to the author, February 25, 1966.
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War England has ever h a d . H^

Haldane was no wild-eyed reform

er, no expert on armies nor did he enter office with ready
made plans and pre-packaged reforms*

H a d Haldane attempted

to build a large Continental Army, it is likely that he too
would have failed*

Yet, Haldane was a scholar, an astute

politician, who shrewdly measured the temper of the times
and realized that the tax-burdened public and his own
economy-minded party would not support a scheme for a gigantic
army*

He therefore wisely mated efficiency and economy and

placed into the hands of Britain an army which was an effective
instrument of war*
There were many who labored with Haldane to bring
about these great changes in the British Army*
tial Lord Esher,

The influen

Generals Haig, Nicholson, Ewart, Grierson,

the redoubtable Colonel Ellison,
ultimately, the responsibility,

the list is a long one*

Yet

the success and the failures

must rest on Haldane*s shoulders alone*
passed, yet the foundation remains*
present Chief of the General Staff,

Sixty years have

General Cassells, the
states,

Despite the fact that we have now felt it necessary
to discard the framework for the Reserves which he
2jtaldaneyrestablished, and which served the British
Nation so well in two W orld Wars, it is remarkable
tribute to his foresight and clear thinking that
few really significant changes to this Reserve
framework have been found necessary until now*2-L
20Haldane, An Autobiography, pp* 307-3Q8;

Charteris,

P. 37.
2 ^-Letter, Cassells to the author, February 25, 19^6«
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Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck credits Haldane "with
creating 11• • . A n
191^ -1 91 8 * 1,22

army fit to fight in the great war of

Field Marshal Alexander refers to the Haldane

reforms as "the basis of our armed forces."2 ^
The British Army has changed, with the needs of the
times* yet even now after sixty years have passed,
Spirit of Haldane L i v e s . B u t

"The

the greatest tribute of all

is the accolade bestowed by the man in the street who even
now, more than half a century later, when he wishes to pay
a compliment to a present Minister of War calls him,

"The best

since Haldane."2-*

22Letter from Field-Marshal,
the author, March 12, 1966.
(Harold

Sir Claude Auchinleck to

2^Letter from Field-Marshal, the Right Honorable
G . ) Alexander to the author, February 23* 1966.

Earl

^ L e t t e r from Brigadier, Sir
John K. Dunlop, Military
Author and historian to the author, May 31* 1966.
2^Letter from Major General, E.K.G.
tary Author to the author, March 29, 19&6.

Sixsmith, Mili

APPENDIX A
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE REGULAR ARMY WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE*
ALDERSHOT COMMAND
1st Cavalry Brigade
1st Division
1st Brigade - Aldershot
2nd Brigade - Blackdovjn
3rd. Brigade - Bordon
Three Field Artillery Brigades of three batteries each
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
Two Royal Engineer Divisional Telegraph Companies
2nd. Division
Lth (Guards) Brigade - London
5th Brigade - Aldershot
6th Brigade - Aldershot
Three Field Artillery Brigades
Two Royal Engineers Field Companies
Army Troops

x

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st

and
and
and
and
and

2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd
3rd

Royal Engineer Air Line Companies
Royal Engineer Cable Telegraph Companies
Wireless Telegraphy Companies
Royal Engineer Balloon Companies
Bridging Train
EASTERN COMMAND

2nd Cavalry Brigade - Canterbury
Lth Cavalry Brigade - Colchester

*John K# Dunlopf The Development of the British
Army, 1899-191**
(London s Methuen $ 193$)% P P • 262-264*
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4th Division
10th Brigade - Sborncliffe
11th Brigade - Colchester
12th Brigade - Chatham
Three Field Artillery Brigades
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
IRISH COMMAND
3rd Cavalry Brigade - Curragh
5th Division
13th Brigade - Dublin
14th Brigade - Curragh
15th Brigade - Belfast
Three Field Artillery Brigades
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
6th Division
l6th Brigade - Fermoy
17th Brigade - Tipperary
18th Brigade (In Northern Command with Battalion at York,
Lichfield (two) and Sheffield)
Three Field Artillery Brigades
One Royal Engineer Field Company
SOUTHERN COMMAND
1st Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy Brigade
2nd. Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy Brigade
3rd Division
7th Brigade — Tidworth
8th Brigade - Devonport
9th Brigade - Portsmouth
Three Field. Artillery Brigades
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
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